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ABSTRACT
This paper summarizes the many aspects of public policy for health care. I first consider government
policy affecting individual behaviors. Government intervention to change individual actions such as smoking and
drinking is frequently justified on externality grounds. External costs of smoking in particular are not very high
relative to current taxes, however. More important quantitatively are the internal costs of smoking to the smoker.
A recent literature has debated whether such internalities justify government action.
I then turn to markets for medical care and health insurance. Virtually all governments provide health
insurance for some part of the population. Governments face several fundamental choices in this provision. The
first choice is between operating the medical system publicly or contracting for care from private providers. The
make-or-buy decision is difficult in medical care because medical quality is not fully observable. Thus, private
sector efficiency may come at the expense of quality. A second choice is in the degree of cost sharing. More
generous insurance reduces the utility cost of illness but also leads to overconsumption of care when sick. Optimal
insurance balances the marginal costs of risk bearing and moral hazard. In the US, government policy has
historically tilted towards more generous insurance, by excluding employer payments for health insurance from
income taxation. The welfare loss from this subsidy has been a theme of much research. Finally, governments face
issues of competition and selection. Sick people prefer more generous insurance than do healthy people. If insurers
know who is sick and who is healthy, they will charge the sick more than the healthy. This differential pricing is
a welfare loss, since it denies sick people the benefits of ex ante pooling of risk type. Even if insurers cannot
separate sick from healthy, there are still losses: high costs of generous plans discourage people from enrolling in
those plans. Generous plans also have incentives to reduce their generosity, to induce sick people to enroll
elsewhere. Adverse selection is empirically very important. To date, public policies have not been able to offset
it. 
Finally, I turn to the distributional aspects of medical care. Longstanding norms support at least basic
medical care for everyone in society. But the generosity of health programs for the poor runs up against the
possibility of crowding out private insurance coverage. Analysis from Medicaid program expansions shows that








dcutler@harvard.eduGovernments are involved in the medical sector in many ways.  The most noticeable role of
government is as a health insurer.  In most developed countries, governments guarantee health
insurance to the entire population.  The United States is an outlier; governments insure some, but
not all, of the population.  Some governments also provide medical services.  Medical care delivery
is entirely public in some countries and even in the privately-dominated US, governments run 15
percent of the hospitals.  The tax side of the ledger is also important.  In the United States, the
Federal government subsidizes employer-provided health insurance by excluding contributions for
this insurance from taxable income.  The amount of revenue foregone by this exclusion is nearly $60
billion in income taxes alone per year, or about 15 percent of direct government payments for
medical care.  In addition, governments tax goods with adverse health consequences, such as
smoking and drinking, with the idea of improving health.  Finally, governments regulate health care.
Governments restrict insurance companies (what can be offered and to whom), license medical care
providers, and approve new drugs and devices before they can be sold.  
What role should the government have in health care?  What is the empirical evidence about
the efficacy of government interventions?  Since health care is so central to the public sector,
addressing these questions is a prime concern of public economics.  I pursue these questions in
stages. 
Figure 1 shows a conceptual diagram underlying the public sector role in health care.
Individual utility depends on health and other goods.  Health, in turn, depends on many factors.
Individual behaviors are important; behaviors influence health and also utility directly.  The
environment affects health, more so in the past when water and sanitation were serious health
hazards than today, but even today environmental issues are important.  Medical care is a third factor1 There is some literature claiming that in societies with more inequality in income,
average health is lower (Wilkinson, 1996).  Such claims are controversial, though (Deaton,
2001).
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influencing health.  Medical care cannot be understood without analyzing the health insurance
market, its subsidiary.  Other factors noted in the figure might also influence health but are farther
removed from the public sector, including genetics and socioeconomic status.
1  I thus focus on
behavioral, environmental, and medical influences on health.
The simplest situation to analyze is the health-related behaviors that people engage in.  The
canonical individual cases here are smoking and drinking; both have benefits to the individual
(direct consumption value), but adverse health consequences for the individual using them and
possibly others.  At the firm level, pollution has similar characteristics; it helps to produce goods
and services that individuals want, but has byproducts that are harmful to health.
The  classic  economic  rationale  for  government  involvement  in  such  activities  is  on
externality grounds; people who smoke, drink, or pollute cause harm to others, and these costs
should be internalized when people make their behavioral decisions.  As we shall see, however, the
situation  is  not  so  clear.  Estimating the external costs of smoking and drinking is not so
straightforward in part because smoking, and to a lesser extent drinking, is associated with some
external benefits, as people pay taxes over their working life but die at a younger age.  There is a
spirited debate about whether these activities are on net costly or beneficial to society, and thus
whether the optimal tax is high or low. 
In addition to concerns about externalities, governments may also want to intervene to
prevent people from worsening their own health.  Rational people will take personal health harms
into account when making behavioral decisions.  But if consumption decisions are not rational,3
driven by impulse, fashion, or fad, taxes might be needed for ‘internality’ reasons.  While it is
difficult to know how much of these costs are accounted for in the individual consumption decision,
the  total internal costs of smoking and drinking dwarf the external costs, making this issue
particularly  salient.  Economic research on the external and internal costs of health-related
individual behaviors is summarized in Section II.
By far the largest government involvement in the health sector is in the market for medical
care, and its derivative health insurance.  Medical care markets are plagued by a host of potential
problems, presented in section III: incomplete information on the part of patients; asymmetric
information between consumers and producers about what patients really need; inability to tell
whether services are justified, even ex post; externalities from consumption; moral hazard from
insurance; adverse selection in insurance; and redistributive goals not met by the market.  With such
a litany of problems, it is no surprise that free markets for medical care function poorly.
These market failures sometimes lead governments to provide medical care directly.  The
choice between government and private provision of services is an important one, and countries
differ on this decision.  The central issue in this debate is whether public and private incentives are
properly aligned.  Government provision is generally believed to be less technically efficient than
private provision, and medical care is no exception.  But lack of a profit motive may be a virtue in
some cases.  When private providers would not act in the public interest, as for example a for-profit
hospital that skimps on medical care because skimping is hard to detect, government provision may
be superior to private sector provision.  The empirical import of this argument is unknown.  But such
an analysis offers a lens through which to view institutional norms in the medical care field (the
Hippocratic Oath; not-for-profit firms) that have traditionally worked to keep medical care quality
high.  These issues are explored in Section IV.2 As discussed below, this is not technically right.  The goal of insurance is to equalize
the marginal utility of income in different states of nature.  In many cases, this can be achieved
by smoothing the financial costs of medical care, but not always.
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While governments are only sometimes involved in medical service provision, they are
universally involved in health insurance provision.  No developed country has an entirely private
system of health insurance, even though many countries have (essentially) private medical care
delivery systems.  
In the case of one individual purchasing insurance, there is a classic economic tradeoff that
governments must respect.  Insurance smooth s the financial risk associated with medical costs.
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Optimal  insurance  from  a  risk-bearing  perspective  involves  no  out-of-pocket  spending.  But
insurance also creates moral hazard; people spend more when they have insurance than they would
otherwise because the price of medical services is lower.  As insurance increases in generosity, the
marginal gain from risk bearing falls while the marginal loss from moral hazard rises.  The optimal
level of insurance is the point at which the marginal gain in reduced risk bearing from additional
insurance just equals the marginal loss from additional moral hazard.  For a government running a
health insurance system, this is the rule it needs to know.
Even in a private health insurance system, this rule has significant import.  In the United
States, the tax treatment of health insurance distorts the tradeoff between risk sharing and moral
hazard.  Where out-of-pocket spending on medical care must be purchased with after-tax dollars,
employer payments for health insurance are not counted as income for personal tax purposes and
thus  receive  an implicit subsidy.  This subsidy encourages the provision of overly generous
insurance.  This has been alleged to lead to too much moral hazard, with empirical estimates
suggesting a welfare loss of up to 10 percent of medical spending.  There is substantial uncertainty5
about the true welfare loss, however, because the relevant elasticities are not all known, because this
calculation does not account for the dynamics of technological innovation, and because the tax
subsidy may offset other market failures such as adverse selection and crowding out of private
insurance by other public programs.  Section V examines this host of issues.
Traditional analysis of optimal insurance, including the welfare loss from the tax subsidy,
has concentrated on the demand side of the medical care market, controlling utilization by making
patients pay more for the services they receive.  Insurance might also affect the supply side of the
market, by changing what physicians and hospitals provide.  Managed care in the United States,
along with virtually all medical care systems in other countries, uses supply side measures to limit
overall spending.  Theoretical analysis suggests, and empirical evidence confirms that supply-side
measures  are  a  complement  to  demand-side  measures,  since  physicians respond to payment
incentives along with price.  The optimal use of supply and demand side restrictions, and the
implications of supply side measures for other government policies such as the tax exclusion of
employment-based health insurance is explored in section VI.
If individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their underlying medical risk, even more
problems arise.  Individuals who are greater risk for medical care spending like more generous
health insurance than those who are lower risk.  If insurers know who is high risk and who is low
risk, they can price policies accordingly.  Individuals will be fully insured, but higher risk people
will pay higher premiums.  While this is efficient ex post (after risk types are known), it is a welfare
loss ex ante.  People would like to insure their risk type but do not get to do so.  
In other settings, knowledge of individuals’ risk type is limited or insurers are not allowed
to use such information in pricing.  This situation might appear better than the previous one, since
insurers cannot segment risks on their own.  But problems arise here as well.  As people sort6
themselves across plans, the sick will drive up the price of more generous plans, while the less
generous plans remain much cheaper.  This process, termed adverse selection, leads to three sources
of welfare loss.  First, the sick once again pay more for insurance than the healthy, leading to the
same risk segmentation loss noted above.  Second, marginal people are induced to enroll in less
generous insurance plans, so that they can benefit from the lower insurance premiums that being
with healthy people allows.  Third, plans are encouraged to reduce the generosity of their benefits,
to attract the healthy and repel the sick.  Empirical evidence shows large distortions from adverse
selection.  In nearly every setting without a mandatory, universal insurance plan, the sick wind up
paying more for insurance than the healthy.
A variety of public sector activities may address problems of risk segmentation and adverse
selection, ranging from mandatory pooling in one plan (as is done in many countries), to restrictions
on what private insurers can offer to individuals.  To date, public policies to combat adverse
selection short of having a single national insurance plan have been only marginally successful.
Problems arising from heterogeneity and the impact of public policies in these situations are
discussed in section VII.  
The analysis of heterogeneity brings up a related topic: whether people should be allowed
to supplement public insurance with private insurance.  Were everyone homogeneous, a single
public (or private) plan would be appropriate.  When individuals are heterogeneous, however,
supplementation may be a valuable option.  The most controversial form of supplementation is
allowing the wealthy to buy better care than the public system provides the rest of society.  Some
countries  forbid  this  on  egalitarian  grounds;  others  allow  it.  Theoretically, this type of
supplementation need not harm, and could help the poor, if the government saves enough off of the
rich opting out to afford more care for the poor.  I discuss this issue in Section VIII. 7
Finally, Sections IX and X turn to intragenerational and intergenerational distributional
aspects of health and medical care policy.  The goal of many governments is to ensure adequate
quality of medical care to the poor.  In universal health insurance systems, such goals are relatively
easily met.  When health insurance is not universal, special programs must be designed for the poor.
The United States has a patchwork of such programs: Medicaid provides health insurance for the
poor; public hospitals provide significant uncompensated care; and even private hospitals provide
‘free care’ to the uninsured.  The design of health programs for the poor poses a classic economic
tradeoff: more generous public coverage promotes health but may also induce people who would
have bought private coverage to drop that coverage.  
The health and insurance consequences of programs for the poor can be evaluated using a
unique natural experiment: in the 1980s and 1990s, Medicaid eligibility was expanded to people
with somewhat higher incomes and different family circumstances.  I review the literature on
whether the Medicaid expansions crowded out private insurance coverage, and whether they led to
health improvements for the poor.  Crowding out is a significant empirical issue.  Estimates suggest
that up to one-half of the increase in public coverage from Medicaid eligibility expansions is offset
by reductions in private coverage.  Even with this crowding out, however, some evidence suggests
that the Medicaid spending is worth the cost.  Because health is worth so much, even small
improvements in health from additional insurance can justify its high cost.
Before starting the analysis it is important to note several background points.  I focus on
public sector health issues exclusively.  This chapter is not a synthesis of health economics writ
large.  Readers interested in learning more about health economics as a whole should consult the
recent two volume Handbook series on the topic (Culyer and Newhouse, 2000a,b). 
I also focus to a large extent on the United States.  This is in many ways inevitable; the data3 Throughout this section, I consider the 23 most developed countries in the OECD,
omitting Turkey and newer members such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, and
Poland.
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with which to analyze medical care systems are better in the United States than in other countries.
Conceptually, the United States also presents many interesting economic issues, since the range of
institutions and observed outcomes is much greater.
Finally, I note the crucial distinction between health and medical care.  Good health is what
people want; medical care is a means to that end.  I shall use the terms health and medical care
precisely, with one exception: I shall write about health insurance and not medical care insurance.
While the latter is technically more appropriate, the former is too ingrained in the literature for me
to do otherwise. 
Before turning to the analytic issues about the public sector role in health care, I start in the
next section by providing more background on medical systems generally and the role of the public
sector in those systems.
I.  Medical Care and the Public Sector
The medical sector is a large part of most developed countries.  The average country in the
OECD
3 spent 8 percent of national income on medical care in 1995.  The high was 14 percent (the
United States); the low was 6 percent (Greece).  Further, the medical sector is growing rapidly.
Since 1929, the earliest year for which we have data, medical care in the United States has increased
at a rate of 3.8 percent in real, per person terms.  GDP growth, in comparison, has been only 1.7
percent, more than 2 percentage points lower.  This differential is large in other countries as well.9
Medical spending in the average OECD country increased over 2 percentage points more rapidly
than GDP growth between 1960 and 1995.  
Governments pay for a significant share of medical expenses, as Figure 2 shows.  In the
United States, governments pay for nearly 50 percent of medical spending.  This is the lowest in the
OECD.  The average share is 76 percent, and ranges as high as 93 percent (Luxembourg).
Government wasn’t always so important.  In 1929, governments in the United States accounted for
14 percent of medical spending.  As late as 1965, the government’s share was only one-quarter.
By another metric, nearly 20 percent of Federal government spending in the United States
is devoted to medical care, with a similar share for state and local governments.
Understanding what government does in the medical sector requires more detail about that
sector.  Figure 3 depicts the medical sector in a fundamental fashion, via the medical care triad.
There are three actors in the medical care system, shown as the points on the triad: patients,
providers, and insurers.  Patients pay money to insurers, and sometimes directly to providers.
Insurers pay for the bulk of medical services, and also set rules on when and where patients can seek
care.  Providers diagnose medical problems, recommend appropriate treatment, and provide those
treatments.
Governments can be involved in the medical care system at several levels (Besley and
Gouveia, 1994).  Some countries have a largely private system of insurance and medical care
delivery, with government having a predominantly regulatory role.  The United States is an example
of such a system, as table 1 shows.  It is the only developed country without universal insurance
coverage.  Other countries, including Canada and Germany, have public insurance with
predominantly private providers.  Finally, some countries have public insurance and public
ownership of medical care delivery.  The United Kingdom is a leading example of this type of10
country.
The  history  of  the  public  sector  in  medical  care  is  a  movement  towards increasing
government involvement (Cutler and Johnson, 2001).  The first government health insurance system
was enacted by Bismarck in the 1880s; health insurance was created with Old Age Insurance to give
people a stake in the survival of the state.  The United Kingdom introduced a health insurance
program for the poor early in the 20
th century.  But such programs were small because medical care
could not do a lot.  In the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries, effective medical treatments were rare
and medical costs were not highly variable.  Medical insurance became more valuable for reasons
other than redistribution as spending became more variable.  
It wasn’t until after World War II that medical care insurance became a priority.  The
efficacy of penicillin was demonstrated around that time, and advances in surgery were made.  With
technological change came variability in medical spending; having access to the medical sector
became more important.  The post-World War II period saw a flowering of health insurance and
provision systems (Cutler, 2001).  The British set up the first truly national medical care system in
1946.  The NHS provided insurance and delivered medical services.  This was followed in
subsequent decades by other European countries and Canada.  Generally, the later the country
established national insurance, the less the government became involved in medical care delivery
and the more it took an insurance role.
The United States was relatively late to enact public insurance.  Private insurance coverage
grew steadily during and after World War II, but there was no significant public insurance until
Medicare and Medicaid were created in the mid-1960s.  And while the United States has tinkered
with these systems continuously since then, there have been no major expansions in public insurance4 The Medicaid expansions of the late 1980s and early 1990s, discussed in Section IX,
were the most significant insurance expansions since then.
5 Formally, eligibility is for workers or dependents of workers with 40 quarters of Social
Security covered earnings.  Only a few percent of the elderly are not eligible for Medicare.  The




Because so much research on health economics is conducted using US data, it is instructive
to describe that system in more detail.  Table 2 shows the sources of insurance coverage in the
United States.  There are two significant public programs for medical care. Medicare is the larger
program,  spending  about  $200 billion annually, or one-fifth of total medical care spending.
Essentially everyone over age 65 is eligible for Medicare, along with the blind and disabled and
people with end-stage kidney failure.
5  Medicare insures 14 percent of the population.
Most  Medicare  beneficiaries  (about  85  percent)  are  in  the  traditional  fee-for-service
insurance plan.  Beneficiaries in that plan have complete choice about which providers to see.  But
covered services are limited.  Unlike essentially all private insurance policies, the traditional
Medicare program does not cover outpatient prescription drugs.  It also does not cover chronic need
for long-term care services such as a nursing home or home health aid, although this is generally
absent from private policies as well.  In total, Medicare beneficiaries account for 37 percent of
medical costs.  This share is greater than Medicare’s share of spending (about 20 percent of total
costs), reflecting the relatively limited scope of Medicare covered services. 
About 15 percent of Medicare beneficiaries are in managed care arrangements.  Medicare
pays managed care plans a fixed amount for each person they enroll.  Because the payments
traditionally did not account for adverse selection adequately, these payment were believed to
exceed the cost of caring for Medicare beneficiaries.  Medicare lost money when people enrolled6 People with both Medicare and Medicaid coverage are included in the Medicare row,
since Medicare is their primary insurance policy.
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in managed care (Sing, Brown, and Hill 1998).  Medicare is now implementing a system to more
accurately account for adverse selection in plan payments, as discussed in Section VII.
Medicaid  is the other major public insurance program.  Medicaid eligibility is more
heterogeneous.  Two-thirds of program enrollees are poor, non-elderly women and children.   These
beneficiaries were traditionally in fee-for-service policies but increasingly have been enrolled in
managed care plans.  The blind and disabled are another recipiency group, prior to Medicare
eligibility.  Medicare eligibles can receive Medicaid if they have low incomes, or if their medical
spending makes them have low disposable income.  For these “dual eligibles”, Medicaid will pay
for cost sharing required by Medicare and uncovered services such as prescription drugs and long-
term care.  Because the elderly and disabled are more expensive than women and children, program
spending is distributed relatively equally between the non-elderly poor, the blind and disabled, and
the elderly.  Fourteen percent of people have Medicaid as their primary insurance policy; these
people in total account for 8 percent of medical spending.
6
Finally, there are other, small public programs, including services for veterans, Native
Americans, and dependents of active duty military personnel.  These insure 1 percent of people and
account for 5 percent of total medical spending.
The vast bulk of the non-elderly population (90 percent of those with insurance) has
insurance through employment; only 10 percent of private insurance is purchased individually.  The
reason for this predominance of employment-based insurance is the tax subsidy to employer-
provided health insurance, discussed below.  Private insurance spending accounts for nearly half of
total medical spending.7 Different surveys give somewhat different estimates of the uninsured population.  The
most commonly used number is about 15 percent, from the Current Population Survey.  The
MEPS data in table 2 show slightly lower shares, but the difference is not important in this
context.
8   Out-of-pocket payments in total account for one-fifth of medical spending.  
13
Finally, about 12 percent of the population is uninsured.
7  Such people still receive care and
account for about 4 percent of medical spending.
8  But uninsured people do not pay for all of their
utilization.  The average uninsured person pays for only 44 percent of the medical services he uses.
Part of the rest is financed by other government programs (for example, the Veterans Administration
system), while another part is financed indirectly, by providers marking up the bills to other payers
and using the additional revenues to offset the losses of the uninsured.
II.  Public Policy for Health-Related Behaviors
Individual and firm behaviors are a clear factor affecting health, both positively and
negatively.  Smoking and drinking reduce health, while exercise and vitamin consumption improve
health.  At the firm level, pollution and the work setting also affect health.  I start the analytic
analysis of government policy for health care by considering health-related behaviors.  At first
glance, the analysis of health-related goods is no different than the analysis of any other good.  If
people value consumption of cigarettes and are willing to pay the monetary and health consequences
of their actions, public policy need not intervene in this decision.  This analysis is incomplete for
two reasons, however.  First it ignores external effects – the harms these behaviors bring to others
that the individual smoker or drinker does not take into account.  Governments may want to tax or
subsidize these activities to get people to account for these effects.  Second, people may not make10 Taxation and regulation also differ in situations of uncertainty.  Taxes allow quantities
to vary in situations where demand shocks change the marginal value of the good, while
regulation does not.  Such variability may or may not be valuable, depending on the sensitivity
of social damages to changes in consumption (Weitzman, 1974).
11 See Chaloupka and Warner (2000) and Cook (2000) for discussions of the economics




Historically, government action was much more important than taxation or subsidies in
promoting health-improving behavior.  Early in the 20
th century, for example, the government
cleaned the water supply and built sewers to improve population health, when it could alternatively
have taxed dirty water or poor sanitation.  In the case of these public health improvements, the gains
were so large (Preston, 1996) that government action may have been the efficient solution.
II.2 Estimating External Consequences of Smoking and Drinking
There has been a spirited economic debate about the optimal Pigouvian taxes on smoking
and to a lesser extent drinking.
11  The issue is particularly difficult because it is not even clear
whether these goods have negative external costs.  Although smokers use more medical services for
smoking-related illnesses than non-smokers, they also die at younger ages.  As a result, smokers pay
into social programs such as Social Security and Medicare throughout their working lives, but
collect much less in old age.  This death benefit offsets some or all of the fiscal costs of smoking.
Table 3 summarizes the literature on the external costs of smoking and drinking.  The start
of any such analysis is defining internal and external costs.  Damages that the smoker suffers as a
result of smoking are clearly internal.  But are damages to other household members from second-12 One could assert that some effects outside of the family are internalized.  If a person
chooses to ride in a car with a friend who drives drunk and kills them both, the death of the
passenger is counted as an external cost but is conceptually similar to a fully-informed decision
to live with a smoker. 
13 The relation between smoking and Social Security payments was first noted by Shoven
et al. (1989).
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hand smoke?  What about damages to an unborn fetus from a pregnant woman smoking?  There is
no obvious answer here.  The most common assumption is that the family is the unit of decision-
making, so that consequences of smoking and drinking for other family members are internalized.
12
One must then specify the external costs to consider.  The most important financial costs are
medical  care  payments  financed by insurance (either public or private), and Social Security
payments net of taxes paid in.  Other more minor costs include life and disability insurance premia,
and the costs of fires from smoking.  Possible health consequences from second-hand smoke are
more controversial.  While the literature is clear that there are adverse health consequences for some
conditions such as childhood respiratory illnesses, there is more uncertainty about more costly
illnesses such as cancer and cardiovascular disease in adults.  
The first complete analysis of the external costs of smoking and drinking was presented in
Manning et al. (1989, 1991).
13  Consistent with the literature at the time, Manning et al. assumed no
external costs from secondhand smoke.  Thus, the only external costs they consider are financial.
Manning et al. conclude that the external costs of smoking are modest, ranging from -$.91 to $.24
per pack with different discount rates.  The high estimates of external costs are associated with high
discount rates; at those rates, the external benefits of smokers dying young are minimized.  With no
or low discounting, the external costs of cigarette usage are negative.14 Taxation is not the only government involvement in smoking.  There is a long history
of cigarette regulations, including bans on radio and television advertisements, minimum
purchase and consumption ages, and restrictions on smoking in public places.  On the other side
are subsidies to tobacco farmers.  Generally, the literature finds that non-price policies do affect
consumption, although the effects are relatively modest (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000).
15 And in some other countries, cigarette taxes are even greater.  
19
Current cigarette taxes are substantially greater than this amount.
14  Formal cigarette taxes
at the Federal and state level average about $.75 per pack in the United States.  The recent Master
Settlement Agreement between the states and tobacco companies resulted in price increases of about
$.45 per pack, effectively a further increase in taxes (Cutler et al., 2000, 2002).
15  Thus, by these
estimates cigarette taxes are well above the optimal tax based on externalities alone.  This
conclusion has been refined by Viscusi (1995), with similar findings.
The conclusion that cigarettes are overtaxed has drawn several critiques.  One critique is the
omission of damages from second-hand smoke.  Although the scientific evidence on the effect of
secondhand smoke on illness is still sketchy, some estimates indicate very large effects on health
(Environmental Protection Agency, 1992; Glantz and Parmley, 1995).  Related to this issue is the
assumption that the family is the unit of decision-making and not the individual.  If the individual
were the unit of analysis, external effects such as damages from secondhand smoke within the
family and the increased probability of pregnant women having low birthweight infants would also
enter into the analysis.  Such effects can be very large.  Viscusi (1995), for example, estimates that
the external costs of secondhand smoke including lung cancer and heart disease may be $.10 or more
per pack.  Evans, Ringel, and Stech (1999) conclude that the external costs of smoking including
maternal behavior are extremely high, ranging from $.42 to $.72 per pack.  Current cigarette taxes
are not unreasonable given these estimates.20
The third, and more fundamental critique, has to do with the exclusion of internal costs.  This
analysis implicitly assumes that individuals know about and adequately incorporate all adverse
health consequences to themselves.  I return to this assumption below.
Estimates of the external costs of drinking are complicated by the fact that not all drinking
is associated with adverse consequences.  Most of the external costs of drinking result from
substantial drinking at one time – generally defined as alcohol above 2 ounces per sitting.  About
40 percent of alcohol consumed is believed to be above this level.  If taxes change the share of heavy
drinkers in comparison to light drinkers, it will also change the Pigouvian tax rate.
The bottom panel of table 3 shows the estimates of the external costs of drinking.  Manning
et al. estimated the external costs of alcohol at $1.19 per excess ounce of alcohol (in 1986 dollars).
The most important external costs are from with motor vehicle fatalities resulting from drunk
driving.  Since these occur shortly after the drinking episode, the estimates of external costs are not
very sensitive to the discount rate chosen.  
Current alcohol taxes in the United States are below the optimal tax rates shown in Table 3.
Federal, state and local taxes are about $.27 cents per ounce for spirits, $.13 cents per ounce for beer,
and $.12 per ounce for wine.  Thus, the Manning et al. estimates suggest that alcohol tax rates should
be substantially increased if they are designed to offset Pigouvian externalities.
Other studies have refined, but not substantially changed, this analysis.  Pogue and Sgontz
(1989) note that alcohol taxes involve a deadweight loss for light and moderate drinkers, who
currently face higher taxes than is optimal (since the costs of light and moderate drinking are low).
Pogue and Sgontz and Kenkel (1996) both conclude that even taking this into account, current taxes
are well below the optimal tax. 
There are a range of other goods that could be analyzed in a similar fashion, but have not16 This estimate may not apply to specific years at older ages.  In general, not much work
has examined how willingness to pay estimates differ by age, although Krupnick et al. (2000)
generally find similar willingness to pay estimates for the old.
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been.  Gun ownership, for example, imposes substantial external costs, but there are no estimates
of external costs in the literature.  Extending this analysis to other goods is a clear research priority.
II.3 Internal Costs and Rational Addiction
Perhaps the most important economic issue in the analysis of individuals behaviors is the
question of whether individuals correctly account for the adverse effects of such behavior on their
own health.  If individuals do not, the case for corrective government action is even stronger.
Consider just the case of smoking.  Smokers on average die about 6 years younger than non-
smokers, a loss of roughly 2 hours per pack of cigarettes.  Consensus estimates in the literature value
a year of life at about $100,000 per year (Viscusi, 1993; Tolley et al., 1994; Cutler and Richardson,
1997). 
16 Thus, the cost to a smoker from early mortality alone (ignoring morbidity or out-of-pocket
medical expenses and not discounting) is about $22 per pack.  Such costs dwarf the external costs
presented above.
For most goods, economists are willing to assume that individuals correctly internalize these
costs.  After all, if a person were buying a good he did not value, he could simply stop buying the
good.  In the case of smoking and drinking, however, the situation is more complicated.  Such goods
are addictive, and it is not as easy to end consumption of an addictive good as it is for non-addictive
goods.
Addictiveness by itself does not mean that consumption is inefficient.  Becker and Murphy
(1988) and Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994) present a theoretical model of rational addiction,17 A different type of test is whether smokers accurately perceive the health costs of their
smoking decision.  Viscusi (1994) argues that smokers, if anything, overstate the health
consequences of smoking.  Schoenbaum (1997) suggests this is not true for heavy smokers.
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showing that individuals may rationally decide to consume goods that are bad for them, if the
current and future consumption benefits are sufficiently high.  The idea is straightforward: rational
smokers know that utility in the future depends on smoking decisions today, and factor in future
utility costs and benefits when they decide how much to smoke today.  People who do this correctly
will not be helped by government intervention, other than providing information about true health
risks.  This is in contrast to the pure myopic model of addiction, where individuals make
consumption decisions today without thinking about their future consequences.  Government policy
can help such myopic individuals to account for the future consequences of their current actions.
Testing the rational addiction model empirically is not easy, since the interesting alternative
hypothesis is not the myopic model, but instead a model of addiction in which consumption is
forward-looking but less than perfectly so.  Most empirical analysis has focused on a test of forward
looking behavior itself: does higher anticipated price lower current consumption?  In a rational
model, it would; if people know that future prices will be higher, they will value current
consumption less, since part of the benefit of current consumption is that it increases the marginal
utility of consumption in the future.  When future prices are higher, the value of that future
consumption  is  lower.  In a myopic model, future prices are not associated with current
consumption.
17
Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994) were the first to test this prediction empirically.
Their test involves regressing current cigarette consumption on past consumption, current prices of
cigarettes, and future cigarette consumption.  They instrument for past and future consumption with19 Arrow (1963) was the first to highlight the conglomeration of difficulties in the
medical care marketplace and much of the subsequent literature draws from that analysis.
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actions in a favorable way.  For example, people might commit to give away a certain amount of
money if they do not stop smoking or commit to enter smoking treatment centers in the future.  If
such commitment devices are effective, they can solve the time consistency problem.  
In the absence of such pre-commitment devices, however, government intervention will be
appropriate, including taxation or regulation.  The goals of government intervention are not so
obvious, however.  If one’s current self wants to smoke but one’s future self would prefer that one
not, which self should the government favor in making policy decisions?  
Overall, the optimal role of government for health-related goods with internal costs is
unknown.  In light of the potentially large welfare consequences associated with this issue, however,
(internal costs up to 100 times greater than external costs considering mortality effects alone)
further theoretical and empirical work on understanding these issues is extremely important.
III.  The Market for Medical Care Services
Once sick, an individual’s health depends to a significant extent on the medical care he
receives.  Public intervention in medical care is pervasive, for good reason.  I lay out in this section
why that is the case, and analyze particular aspects of public intervention in subsequent sections.
19
Information problems.   A first problem with medical care is the nature of information.
People do not know the complexities of medical care diagnosis or treatment.  This is common of20 Perhaps the closest analogy is automobile repair.  See Triplett (2001).
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many goods.
20  But in the medical care case, people often do not have enough time to learn this
information before consumption decisions must be made.  In other settings, there is usually more
time. 
This information asymmetry gives physicians market power.  Physicians recommend to
people what services are appropriate and often provide those services after they are recommended.
Physicians also have leeway in pricing, at a time when consumers have little ability to price shop.
Unless physicians have objective functions looking out for patient welfare, inefficient outcomes will
result. 
Further, determining the quality of services is difficult, even ex post.  Medical care is a
credence good – a good where the quality of the service is often not learned even after it has been
provided (Tirole, 1988; Darby and Karni, 1973). If a patient had a bypass surgery operation, was it
truly necessary?  Not all doctors would agree.  If there were post-operative complications, were they
the fault of the surgeon, or simply a result of the patient’s underlying sickness?  Again, there is room
for disagreement.  
Since quality is so hard to measure, competitive markets will not necessarily work to
improve quality.  A surgeon wishing to improve his bypass surgery mortality rate could work on his
surgical technique or could simply avoid performing surgery on patients with a high mortality risk.
The latter step is easier and may have a larger impact on observed death rates.  It will also be
inefficient, if the patients at high mortality risk are those who need surgery the most.  Perceptions
that  medical  care  may  be  provided  inefficiently  have  been a factor contributing to public
involvement in medical care systems.21 There are other problems as well, but these work in the same direction.  For example,
administrative cost considerations argue for excluding small bills from coverage but paying for
larger bills.  This is similar to the optimal insurance policy with moral hazard.
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Externalities.  Some medical care has external effects.  A person who is not vaccinated for
a communicable disease is at risk of infecting others.  Similarly, a person who uses antibiotics but
stops in mid-course contributes to the development of antibiotic-resistant bacteria.  These types of
externalities are conceptually identical to the externalities associated with smoking and drinking.
Thus, they are not considered further.
Insurance and moral hazard.  Medical care demand is unpredictable.  Healthy people do not
need much medical care; sick people need substantial amounts. This large uncertainty about demand
is the central rationale for health insurance.  Full insurance eliminates the risk associated with
uncertain medical expenses by having the insurer pay for the full cost of all treatments. But such
insurance  creates  its  own problems, the most important of which is  moral  hazard
21  –  the
phenomenon where an individual uses more services because he is insured than he would choose
to do if he could contract for services before he knew what diseases he would have (Arrow, 1965;
Pauly, 1968, 1974; Zeckhauser, 1970; Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971; Kotowitz, 1987).  Insurance
must balance this moral hazard against the gains from improved risk sharing.
Heterogeneity, risk segmentation, and adverse selection.  In a population of individuals
whose underlying health risks are heterogeneous, more and less healthy people will demand
different insurance policies.  Sicker people generally want more extensive health insurance than
healthier people.  This differential demand creates problems for the efficient provision of health28
insurance.  If insurers can segment sick from healthy, all people will be insured but at different
prices.  If they cannot, people will have incentives to pretend they are healthier than they truly are,
a factor termed adverse selection.  In either case, there are problems with market equilibria: people
pay different amounts for insurance when they would have chosen to pool together ex ante; the
allocation of people across plans may be inefficient; and plans may skimp on quality to attract the
healthy and repel the sick.  For all of these reasons, the government may want to be involved.
Equity.  Access to medical care is commonly viewed as a right, not a good in the sense of
luxury cars or expensive houses.  People are unhappy when poor people are not able to get necessary
medical care.  One might justify this concern for the poor on a public health argument; if one person
has  a  communicable  disease  and  does  not  get  treated,  others  are  at  risk  as  well.  But this
characterizes only a small share of disease in a developed country.  There is a fiscal externality
argument as well; when people are healthy, they earn more and pay more in taxes.  But the argument
for redistribution is really much more basic.  Medical care, along with food and shelter, is a good
that society feels everyone should have access to.
This fact has enormous implications for public policy.  Because medical care is so expensive,
the poor cannot be made to pay for it on their own.  Thus, government intervention is necessary to
pay for the medical care of the poor.  Designing such an income transfer system is a central public
economics question.  In part, this is an optimal income tax problem of the type considered in the
chapter by Auerbach and Hines (2001).  But there is a twist: some of the poor will have insurance
prior to the public subsidy.  Thus, in addition to labor supply and savings issues that result from
redistribution, there is also the problem of ‘crowding out’, where an increased government subsidy
encourages more people to join the public program.  Crowding out makes the value of public29
insurance expansions difficult to determine ex ante.  
IV.  Government Versus Private Provision
Given the information problems noted above, it is not obvious that doctor-patient interactions
in an unregulated market will lead to efficient outcomes.  Profit-maximizing physicians may skimp
on care when such skimping cannot be detected.  They may provide more care than is appropriate
if they are paid more for doing so and patients do not know such care is unnecessary.  And prices
may be above marginal cost because patients cannot easily shop for providers.
Governments thus face a fundamental decision in the medical sector; should medical services
be provided privately, or should the government provide medical services itself?  Countries have
made very different decisions about this issue.  In the United Kingdom, hospitals at least historically
were run by governments.  Governments set staffing levels, determined technology allocation, and
decided on appropriate investments.  In the United States, in contrast, providers are mostly private.
Most hospitals are not-for-profit organizations, and physicians are independent practitioners working
(at least historically) on a fee-for-service basis.  The government has a large say in how providers
are paid and what technology investments are made, but it does not control day-to-day resource
decisions.  Other countries are in the middle.  
Countries also change systems over time.  The United Kingdom has introduced some market
forces into the medical sector.  General practitioners ‘fundholders’ can now bargain for rates among
different hospitals and send patients to the hospital of their choosing.  Many hospitals are not-for-
profit trusts.  In the United States, there have been substantial conversions of hospitals between
government, private not-for-profit, and for-profit organizational form over time (Cutler and Horwitz,30
1999).
The make or buy decision in health care has been a subject of debate for decades (see
Propper and Green, forthcoming, for discussion of health care, and Shleifer, 1998, and Poterba,
1996, for a more general discussion).  The traditional debate pitted arguments of monopoly and
monopsony on the one side, and innovation on the other.  Government intervention was justified
because  of  monopoly  power  of  physicians  and  the  information  problems noted above.  By
controlling medical provision, it was believed that the government could use its monopsony power
to purchase such services at a low price.  The counter-argument focused on incentives for efficiency.
Without market incentives, it was feared that government production would be technologically
inefficient and innovation would be stifled.  
Empirically countries where the public sector runs the medical system spend less on medical
care than countries with private providers.  In OECD countries, for example, the correlation between
the public sector share of financing and the share of GDP devoted to medical care is -0.41.  More
formal analysis controlling for additional variables also finds this conclusion (Globerman and
Vining, 1998).  There is also evidence for the inefficiency view.  People in many European countries
are disenchanted with the quality of medical care, and these countries have struggled to increase the
efficiency of the medical care system in recent years (Cutler, 2001).  
A recent literature emphasizing the role of public sector contracting has expanded the
dimension of this analysis, considering issues of allocational as well as technical efficiency (Hart,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; Shleifer, 1998).  Consider the question of whether a government should
provide hospital services itself or contract with a for-profit hospital company to provide the services.
For-profit companies will respond to financial incentives more rapidly than government-run
companies,  since for-profit managers receive more of the payoff from responding to these22 Arrow (1963) was the first to make this argument.
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incentives.  Thus, contracting to a for-profit provider will be preferred if the incentives that the firm
faces are the correct ones.  If the incentives are not correct, however, having more responsive for-
profit firms may lead to poor outcomes, and providing the service in house might be preferred.  
Suppose, for example, that hospitals can skimp on quality without being detected.  For-profit
hospitals  will  skimp  more  than government-run hospitals, since the for-profit firm benefits
financially  from  such  skimping.  If skimping results in substantial welfare loss, government
provision would be preferable to contracting out, even though the for-profit firm may be more
technically  efficient.  In contrast, if the government can write a contract that appropriately
incentivizes the for-profit firm or penalizes the firm for skimping on quality, contracting out would
be superior to in-house provision.  Neither in-house production nor contracting out is necessarily
preferred.  It depends on the contracts the government can write, and the regulatory and monitoring
ability of the government.
Taking this analysis further, one can think about social institutions in the medical care field
as a form of quasi-government institution designed to counteract the adverse incentives that pure
profit-maximization would lead to.
22  Two such institutions are important.  First, doctors have an
ethic to earn the trust of their patients.  This is codified in the Hippocratic Oath of promoting the
best medical outcomes for patients.  Second, not-for-profit firms dominate the medical sector.  Two-
thirds of hospitals in the United States are private not-for-profits, many of them associated with
religious institutions.   By renouncing the ability to turn profits into personal gain, not-for-profit
hospitals commit themselves to less strict incentives for profit-maximization (Glaeser and Shleifer,
2001; Hubbard and Hassett, 2000).  Each of these institutions may help to counteract the adverse23 The organizations may differ along other lines, though.  Duggan (2000) shows that for-
profit and private not-for-profit hospitals respond similarly to incentives to cream-skim the
healthiest patients, while government hospitals are less responsive.
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results that profit maximization with poor information and distorted incentives might produce.
The relative performance of different organizational forms within a system, or different
levels  of  public  and  private ownership across systems, is ultimately an empirical question.
Substantial recent literature has explored this question.  In the United States, comparisons of the
quality of medical care between for-profit, private not-for-profit, and government hospitals generally
suggest that quality is about the same in different organizational forms (see Sloan, 2000, for a
review).
23  But there is substantial heterogeneity in quality within each organizational type, the
source of which is not readily apparent.  
Quality of care comparisons at the level of particular institutions are of limited value,
however, because different organizational forms will influence each other in the marketplace.
Hansmann (1980) argued that quality at for-profit hospitals was kept high because their not-for-
profit competitors provided high quality, making deviations from quality by for-profit hospitals
more readily detectible.  On the other hand, Cutler and Horwitz (1999) and Silverman and Skinner
(2000) argue for an ‘inverse-Hansmann effect’, where for-profit hospitals lead not-for-profit
hospitals to change their behavior in socially-adverse ways. 
Thus, a more relevant question may be whether quality differs across markets with different
overall levels of organizational form: predominantly public, predominantly private not-for-profit,
or predominantly private for-profit.  Such analyses might be conducted in the United States, or
across countries.  Research along these lines has not progressed as rapidly as research at the
institutional level.  It is clear that medical care quality differs substantially across areas; what is less24 I assume m is affordable given y, and that the person will always want to pay for the
medical care if sick.  If medical care does not restore a person to perfect health, the situation is a
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clear is why (Fisher, Skinner and Wennberg, 1998).  Examining how quality relates to overall
organizational form is an important research priority. 
V.  Moral Hazard and the Tax Subsidy to Insurance
Medical spending is extremely variable, as Table 4 shows.  In any year, the top 1 percent of
medical care users consume about 30 percent of all medical care services, and the top 10 percent use
about 70 percent of resources.  Much of this differential use is uncertain; people may know they are
at risk of a serious disease, but rarely do they know the exact amount of their future spending.
This uncertainty about medical care needs drives the demand for health insurance. Health
insurance redistributes money from when people are healthy to when they are sick, alleviating the
financial cost associated with illness and allowing people to afford medical services they would
otherwise not be able to afford.  But health insurance creates problems of its own.  In particular, by
making it easier for people to get medical care when sick, it encourages people to use too much care.
The use of excessive medical services because people are insured is termed moral hazard. In this
section, I discuss the tradeoff between risk bearing and moral hazard.
V.1  Optimal insurance with fixed spending
To see the value of insurance most clearly, consider a one-period model where initially
identical individuals are either healthy or sick.  People are sick with probability p; if they get sick,
they need a fixed amount of medical care, m, after which they are restored to perfect health.
2436
states to sick states until marginal utility is equalized maximizes total expected utility. Health
insurance carries out this transfer.
The form of insurance imagined by this policy is indemnity insurance.  Indemnity insurance
is a fixed payment made to an individual or provider depending on the diagnosis of the individual.
The simplest indemnity policy, first offered by private insurers, reimbursed people a fixed amount
per day they were in the hospital (for example, $5 per day).  Such policies were common in the
United States as recently as the 1960s.  More sophisticated indemnity insurance policies might
condition payment on the diagnosis of the individual, for example $5,000 payment if a person has
pneumonia and $15,000 if the person has cancer.  
Indemnity policies are closely related to their precursor, a pre-payment policy.  In this policy,
a person pays a doctor a fixed amount of money each year, with the doctor agreeing to care for the
person whenever he is sick.  The first Blue Cross/Blue Shield policies were like this.  Blue Cross,
and later Blue Shield, plans were sponsored by providers.  In exchange for fixed monthly payments,
people were guaranteed a certain number of days in the hospital if they were needed (Blue Cross)
and physician services (Blue Shield).  
Indemnity  insurance  is  optimal  if  medical  costs  conditional  on  a  disease are known
(Zeckhauser, 1970).  Prepayment is optimal if the providers one wants to use are all part of the plan
and the providers can bear the payment risk that is required of them.  But neither of these conditions
is necessarily true.  If there is variability in disease severity within indemnity groups which cannot
be contracted on – for example variation in the particular intervention needed or in recovery time
– a fixed indemnity payment still exposes the individual to substantial risk.  Exposure to this risk
involves a welfare loss.  As medical technology has become more complex and optimal treatments
have become more differentiated, the ability to adequately design such policies has declined.28 Unfortunately, the service benefit policy is typically called indemnity insurance (and
contrasted with managed care insurance) in the literature.  I retain the terminology of service
benefit to contrast it with true indemnity insurance.
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Thus, in practice health insurance has moved to a third model, a service benefit policy.
28
Such a policy pays for a percentage of the actual costs of treatment. Service benefit policies are
characterized by three features, shown in figure 5: a deductible (the first amount that a patient pays
before receiving any reimbursement); a coinsurance rate (the share of costs the patient pays above
the deductible); and a stop-loss (the maximum amount the patient can pay).  In the United States,
private service benefit policies generally have a family deductible of about $500 (roughly $200 for
an individual), a coinsurance rate of 20 percent, and a stop-loss of $1,500 to $2,000 (Kaiser Family
Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust, 2000).  The Medicare program has much
higher cost sharing.  Inpatient care has an $800 deductible per episode.  Outpatient care has a $100
annual deductible and 20 percent coinsurance rate, with no stop loss.
Service benefit policies insure a greater share of risk than do indemnity policies.  The central
problem created by service benefit insurance is moral hazard.  By lowering the cost of medical care
at the time of use, the service benefit policy encourages excessive use of services.  This limits the
optimal degree of insurance coverage, as I now show.
V.2 Optimal insurance with moral hazard
To illustrate the impact of moral hazard, I modify the model presented above.  Suppose that
rather than being healthy or sick, the individual has a range of potential illness severities, s, with s
distributed with density function f(s).  Health is given by H=H[s,m].  The patient’s s will determine
the optimal treatment.  A simple way to depict uncertainty about optimal care is to assume that the40
will pay for their care if they do get sick.  Ex post moral hazard refers to people using more services
when they are sick than they would have used if they could perfectly commit to service use before
they become sick.  Ex post moral hazard is likely more important in the medical care context than
ex ante moral hazard, since the uncompensated losses of not taking care of oneself in the first place
(possible death and disability) are so large.  But ex ante moral hazard is present to some extent;
cigarette consumption, for example, would certainly fall if people faced the full cost of smoking in
higher out-of-pocket medical payments.  
In addition, there are losses from the variability in the marginal utility of income across
states  of  nature.  If the coinsurance rate varies with medical spending, the marginal rate of
substitution between health and other goods will vary as well.  When coinsurance rates are lower,
even more is spent on medical care and the marginal rate of substitution between health and other
goods falls.  Smoothing the marginal rate of substitution across states of nature would improve
welfare.
Not all of the demand response to having insurance is moral hazard.  The thought experiment
is whether the individual would pay for the medical expenditure in expectation, before he knew his
condition, not ex post, given his income while sick.  Suppose that bypass surgery optimally costs
$50,000.  Before a person knows if he will have a heart attack, he might agree to pool economy-wide
the $50,000 cost for people who have a heart attack.  Now suppose that ex post two people have a
heart attack: one with insurance and one without. The person without insurance finds the bypass
surgery too expensive and does not receive it.  The person with insurance has the operation, and
because he is insured uses $60,000 of medical care.  The moral hazard here is the $10,000 of use
above the optimal amount, not the $60,000 of total spending difference between the insured and
uninsured person.  In other words, moral hazard is the substitution effect of people spending more44
(17) 
Gruber and Poterba (1996) estimate this expression for a representative sample of individuals in
1994.  The average person with employer-provided insurance faced a relative price of insurance of
0.66, a 34 percent subsidy to insurance payments relative to out-of-pocket spending.  The tax
subsidy varies over time with changes in tax rates; as marginal tax rates have declined in the 1980s
and 1990s, the tax subsidy has fallen.  
This tax subsidy to insurance encourages employees and employers to offer generous health
insurance: lower deductibles, coinsurance rates, and stop-loss limits (Feldstein, 1971, 1973; Pauly,
1987).  When paid for by insurance, these bills cost less in total than when paid for out-of-pocket.
Indeed, one might particularly want to buy insurance for predictable expenditures, since the tax
benefits of this transaction are most readily realized.  Excessively generous insurance, in turn, leads
to more moral hazard than is optimal.  
The magnitude of the resulting welfare loss depends on the elasticity of insurance coverage
with respect to price, and the price elasticity of demand for medical care.  A substantial economic
literature has examined these two issues.  Table 5 presents estimates of the response of health
insurance design to price.  
Four aspects of the health insurance demand have been estimated.  One strand of literature
examines the response of firms offering insurance to prices.  The most convincing studies examine34 Other study designs are more problematic.  One alternative strategy is to examine
whether employers offered higher premiums are less likely to offer insurance (Feldman et al.,
1997, Marquis and Long, 1999).  The difficulty with this strategy is that insurance premiums are
not observed for firms not offering insurance.  Thus, some imputation method must be devised,
and the results depend critically on that method.  In practice, the studies give very different
elasticity estimates.  A second strategy is to analyze the response of firms to pilot programs that
subsidized insurance (Helms et al., 1992; Thorpe et al., 1992), or to hypothetical questions about
insurance coverage (Morrisey et al., 1994).  The difficulty with these studies is the permanence
of the tax change and the relevance of the hypothetical question.  These studies also give quite
variable answers.
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how variation in tax rates across states or over time influence firm decisions to offer coverage.
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Elasticity estimates in these studies range from relatively small (-.4) to quite large (-2.9).  A related
set of studies examines the effect of taxation on overall firm spending for insurance.  This includes
the offer decision and other decisions such as the generosity of benefits and the share of premiums
that employers pay for.  These studies also find a significant response of insurance spending to price,
with a general range of -0.2 to -1.0.  The fact that this is less than the offering response in some
studies may indicate that the lower values of elasticity of offering is correct, or may simply reflect
the difficulty of estimating the overall firm response to taxation.
A third set of studies examines the responsiveness of individual purchase decisions to price.
Again, the studies using taxes as the source of price variation are most convincing.  The responses
are of comparable magnitude and variability to the firm estimates, ranging from -0.6 to -1.8.  
A final set of studies examines the responsiveness of individual choices of insurance policies
when offered multiple plans.  One would expect the choice of a particular plan to be more
responsive than the decision to purchase insurance at all, and this is indeed the case.  While the
studies do not all present elasticities, those that do generally report elasticities greater in magnitude
than -2 and sometimes as high as -8.  
Thus, it is clear that insurance coverage decisions are responsive to price, although the exact46
magnitude is not so clear.  And the literature has not addressed perhaps the most important question
for the welfare loss – the response of specific cost sharing provisions to price.  It is the cost sharing
provisions, after all, that lead individuals to overconsume medical care.  Still, one suspects that this
dimension of insurance is responsive to price.
The second empirical question is the effect of insurance generosity on medical care spending.
A comprehensive review of the literature on the elasticity of demand for medical care is contained
in Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000).  Table 6 shows a summary of that literature.  A substantial
literature in the 1970s estimated the elasticity of demand for medical care using cross-sectional data,
or cross-sectional time series data.  Pre-eminent among these papers are Feldstein (1971), Phelps
and Newhouse (1972), Rosett and Huang (1973), and Newhouse and Phelps (1976).  Feldstein
(1971) was the first statistically robust estimate of price elasticities using time-series micro data, in
this case on hospitals.  Feldstein identified the effect of coinsurance rates on demand using cross-
state variation in insurance coverage and generosity, estimating a demand elasticity of about -0.5.
The subsequent papers use patient-level data and more sophisticated study designs. The elasticities
that emerged from these papers ranged from as low as -.14 (Phelps and Newhouse, 1972) to as high
as -1.5 (Rosett and Huang, 1973).  The implication of this range of elasticity estimates was that
moral hazard was likely a significant force.
To identify this key parameter more precisely, the Rand Health Insurance Experiment was
designed (Newhouse et al., 1993).  That experiment randomized people into insurance plans with
different levels of cost sharing and estimated demand elasticities for medical spending.  The ultimate
elasticity that emerged was -0.2, at the low end of the previous literature.  This estimate is generally
taken as the gold standard in current research and policy work.
The fact that insurance provision is responsive to price and medical spending is responsive35 Feldman and Dowd (1991) compared welfare under a free care plan and a plan with
moderate cost sharing (a $1,000 deductible) and found the latter to be preferred.
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to insurance implies that there is a welfare loss from the tax subsidy to health insurance.  The
magnitude of the loss has been estimated by several papers.  Feldstein and Friedman (1977) was the
first estimate of the magnitude of the loss.  Using estimates of insurance and medical care demand
from Feldstein’s earlier work, Feldstein and Friedman estimate the welfare loss at about 10 percent
of medical care spending.  
As the elasticities of medical care demand were refined, the estimated welfare loss from the
tax subsidy fell.  Chernick, Homer, and Weinberg (1987) used a similar methodology and more
recent data to estimate the loss from the tax exclusion at about 5 percent.
Other analyses have not examined the tax exclusion per se but have simulated optimal
insurance policies and compared them to actual policies.  Some of these studies find that optimal
insurance is less generous than current insurance policies, consistent with the tax loss hypothesis
(Feldstein, 1973; Blomqvist, 1997).  Other studies, however, find that current policies are roughly
optimal (Buchanan et al., 1991; Newhouse et al., 1993; Manning and Marquis, 1996).
35  The
difference between these studies has not been fully reconciled.  In light of the empirical evidence
above, one suspects that there must be some welfare loss from the tax exclusion. The magnitude is
unlikely to be as high as 10 percent, however.
V.4 Qualifications
Several factors are omitted in this analysis.  The first is dynamics – insurance can influence
the development and diffusion of new technology.  As noted above, cost growth in medical care has
been persistently above that in the economy as a whole for many decades.  A majority of this cost48
growth is a result of technological change in medical practice (Newhouse, 1992).  The introduction
of new procedures and devices, and their application to more patients, have been prominent in
medical care.  At least some of this technological change likely results from the generosity of health
insurance (Weisbrod, 1991).  Generous health insurance encourages the diffusion of innovations
once they are available, and in turn the development of new innovations.
To the extent that tax policy has led to more generous medical insurance, it has also
encouraged additional innovation in medical care.  This will have significant welfare consequences,
but the direction of these effects is unknown.  If medical innovation would have been at the efficient
level in the absence of the tax subsidy, the static estimates of welfare loss of the tax subsidy
underestimate the true welfare loss.  But free markets are not guaranteed to produce the right amount
of innovation.  Some of the return to medical innovations cannot be appropriated privately, for
example general knowledge about physiological and biochemical functioning.  The public good
nature of this innovation suggests that private market innovation would be too low.  In this case, the
tax subsidy would be a welfare improvement.  
   Other arguments suggest that free market innovation might be too high.  The patent race
literature shows how the prospect of a patent can encourage excessive research, as potential
innovators race to become the first discoverer of the good.  By further exacerbating  this trend, the
tax subsidy would result in additional welfare loss.
There has been some empirical work on the value of technological change in medicine.
Studies  of  medical  outcomes  typically  find  that  the  average product of changes in medical
technology over time is high (Cutler and McClellan, 2001).  Thus, technological change may not
have been too rapid, and the tax subsidy may be efficiency enhancing.  
A related point is that the tax subsidy may influence the direction of technological change.36 Using individual data and a similar elasticity of -0.5, Gruber and Poterba (1996)
estimate that employer spending would decline by about 25 percent if the subsidy were
eliminated.
49
For example, it might be the case that without the tax subsidy there would be more innovation in
cost-reducing but quality-neutral innovation, while with the tax subsidy innovations are biased
towards those that increase quality and cost.  The welfare implications of such a bias depend on the
same factors that were highlighted in the previous paragraphs.
The second qualification about the welfare loss from the tax exclusion is that it ignores the
value of the subsidy in promoting overall rates of insurance coverage.  By subsidizing insurance
through employment, the tax subsidy encourages more people to be insured than would otherwise
be the case.  This is important because there are other public subsidies, discussed below, that
encourage people to be uninsured.  Counteracting these incentives could therefore improve welfare.
This effect may be substantial.  Recall that the tax subsidy to insurance is, on average, about
34 percent.  If the demand elasticity for insurance is -0.5, well within the range indicated above, the
reduction in insurance coverage from eliminating the tax exclusion is about 17 percent.
36  If all these
people became uninsured, the uninsurance rate would double.  For this reason, many policy
proposals have suggested capping, but not eliminating, the tax subsidy to health insurance.  If the
subsidy were capped at a level roughly equal to relatively inexpensive plans, people would still
receive an inframarginal subsidy to purchase insurance, but face no marginal subsidy to choose more
generous insurance.  The reduction in coverage would be smaller.  
Finally, the tax subsidy encourages the provision of insurance through employment.  Without
the tax subsidy, there would be relatively little reason for employers to provide health insurance
rather than just giving employees cash.  The link between insurance and employment has both good37 There is some debate about whether providers were paid at or above cost.  Most
economists believed that providers were paid above marginal cost and thus ‘induced demand’ for
their services (Fuchs, 1996).
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and bad consequences.  Since employment groups are formed relatively independently of sickness,
encouraging insurance through employment minimizes some of the problems of adverse selection
that occur when individuals buy insurance on their own.  On the other hand, employment-based
insurance leads to a host of labor market problems associated with people being ‘locked’ into jobs
because their health insurance would have to change if they changed employers.  Some estimates
suggest that this job lock plays a significant role in reducing overall rates of turnover in the labor
market, although the issue is not settled (Gruber, 2000; Krueger and Meyer, 2002).
VI. The Supply Side
This analysis of optimal insurance has focused entirely on the demand-side of the market –
designing incentives to get individuals to reduce their demand for medical care while still reducing
risk.  Implicitly, providers were being paid at cost, and thus acted as perfect agents for their patients.
Insurers and providers did not interact, other than for billing purposes.  This was a moderately
accurate picture of the market for medical care in the United States up to the early 1980s,
37 but it is
no longer a good description of how health insurance operates today.  Nor is it relevant for other
countries.
In the United States, the dominant trend in the medical care marketplace over the past two
decades has been the growth of ‘managed care’.  Managed care is a collection of insurance
arrangements in which utilization and prices are limited on the supply, not the demand-side of the38 PPOs are groups of physicians who accept lower fees for access to a network.  Patients
face less cost sharing when using preferred providers than in using providers outside the
network.  HMOs include group or staff model plans, where doctors work only for that plan and
patients can see doctors only in the plan, and looser network or independent practice
arrangement plans, where doctors in the community sign up with one or more plans and may see
patients with multiple plans.  Point of service plans are HMOs that provide some reimbursement
if the enrollee chooses to use providers out of the network.
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market.  Patients usually face little if any cost sharing at the time of service use.  Instead, providers
face a variety of incentives to control utilization.  There are many forms of supply-side restrictions,
including forming networks of providers that agree to lower fees, monitoring and prescribing what
doctors can and cannot do, and giving physicians financial incentives to reduce utilization.
Figure 6 shows the transformation of the private insurance industry in the United States.  In
1980, 92 percent of the population was in unmanaged fee-for-service insurance.  Today, the share
is below 5 percent.  In its place are a variety of managed care plans, including Health Maintenance
Organizations [HMOs], Preferred Provider Organizations [PPOs] and Point of Service Plans
[POSs].
38  Even traditional fee-for-service plans are generally managed, with the insurer monitoring
for excessive utilization and requiring pre-authorization for some services.
Public programs in the United States also use supply side techniques in varying degrees.  In
most states, a significant part of the Medicaid population is enrolled in managed care plans.
Managed care enrollment is much lower in Medicare (only about 15 percent), but the fee-for-service
program does make some use of supply side measures.  For example, hospitals are paid on a per
admission  basis  for  Medicare  enrollees.  Additional days in the hospital or minor tests and
procedures are not reimbursed at the margin.  
In most countries with universal insurance systems, medical care utilization is limited by
supply-side measures more than demand-side measures.  For example, Canada and the United52
Kingdom both limit the capacity of hospitals to provide care (for example, by constraining the
number of open heart surgery units).  As a result, fewer procedures are done, and overall spending
is lower.  Indeed, the greater ability to use supply-side constraints is almost certainly the reason why
countries that operate the medical system spend less than those that provide universal coverage but
use private providers. 
The availability of supply side techniques opens up a host of issues for the public sector.
One central question concerns design of optimal insurance for a country providing such insurance
publicly.  If one has appropriate supply-side cost sharing, is demand-side cost sharing useful?  There
is a lengthy literature on this question.  A rough summary (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000) is that
demand-side and supply-side constraints are not perfect substitutes.  Both methods limit utilization,
but do so on somewhat different margins.  Demand-side cost sharing has a relatively greater impact
on whether a person visits a provider at all, while supply-side cost sharing has a relatively greater
impact on what is done once someone gets into the system.  Thus, the optimal public system
probably includes a combination of demand and supply side constraints.
A related question concerns the impact of supply-side controls on the welfare loss from the
tax exclusion.  If managed care eliminates excessive medical care utilization, has the welfare loss
from the tax exclusion declined?  There is no empirical information on this question.  The fact that
demand and supply side cost sharing are not perfect substitutes means that there is likely still to be
some welfare loss from excessive moral hazard in managed care plans, but it is almost certainly
smaller.
Other issues are important as well.  For supply-side or demand-side rationing to be efficient,
one needs to know that the people not receiving care are the ones who value the care the least.  This
is not guaranteed to be the case.  In the case of demand-side rationing, the evidence generally53
suggests few adverse health effects from cost sharing, consistent with the efficient-rationing view
(Newhouse et al., 1993).  Most estimates of the impact of managed care on health outcomes in the
United States reach a similar view; it is hard to find evidence that health is worse under managed
care plans (Glied, 2000; Miller and Luft, 1997).  In other countries, however, outcomes do appear
to suffer because of supply side constraints (Cutler, 2001).
These issues are too complex to be addressed in detail in this chapter, however.  For
additional discussion, interested readers should consult Glied (2000) or Cutler and Zeckhauser
(2000).
VII.  Heterogeneous risks and selection
I now turn from the analysis of a single individual purchasing insurance to a market setting
with multiple individuals.  The central complication introduced by this is the heterogeneity of risk:
some people are at high risk of being sick, while others are at low risk.  On average, people at higher
risk for disease want more generous insurance than those at lower risk.  This fact creates enormous
difficulties for insurance markets, as I now demonstrate. 
VII.1 Risk segmentation
To illustrate the problems that result from individual heterogeneity in insurance demand,
consider a simple model with two risk types.  Low risks have a small probability of being sick, while
high risks have a greater probability.  Both groups would like to purchase insurance, because for
each group there is uncertainty about whether they will be sick.  To keep matters simple, I suppose
there is no moral hazard or other insurance market imperfection.  I further assume that insurers know54
as well as individuals their expected risk; with genetic tests and medical histories, such knowledge
is becoming increasingly common.
The analysis of this situation is shown in Figure 7.  Rather than one line with fair insurance,
as presented in figure 4, there are now separate fair odds lines for high and low risks.  The fair odds
line for high risks lies inside that of low risks, since a greater premium is required to get a given
payment when sick.  
Offered the option of purchasing insurance at actuarially fair prices, both high and low risks
will choose to buy full insurance; in the absence of moral hazard there is no reason not to do so.  The
equilibrium will therefore be at A and B.  Both groups are fully insured, but high risks pay more for
insurance than low risks.
In practice, if high risks are sufficiently risky or expensive, the insurer may simply choose
not to offer these very high risk groups coverage rather than charge the required price and face
public relations difficulties.  High risks might then be “medically uninsurable.  This is a more of a
political than an economic term, however.
The equilibrium in Figure 7 is efficient given risk types.  But from an ex ante perspective,
before people know their risk type, it is not.  Consider asking people before they know if they are
high or low risk – potentially before birth – whether they would like to buy insurance against the
probability that they will be high risk and thus face higher insurance premiums.  Individuals would
be willing to purchase this insurance were it sold at an actuarially fair price; they get a reduction in
financial uncertainty at no expected cost.  The fact that people wind up paying different prices for
insurance reflects the failure of this insurance market.
This loss seems counterintuitive: everyone has full information and gets full insurance every
year.  What is the source of the loss?  The welfare loss derives from a missing market for insurance55
against one’s risk type.  Risk averse individuals would like to insure against the possibility of being
discovered to be high risk.  There is no market where they can do so.  Given that a market is
missing, there is no guarantee that efficient pricing on the basis of known information as opposed
to level pricing (as if ignorant) will enhance welfare.  This is a classic illustration of the theory of
the second best.  
The market failure might also be thought of as stemming from a contracting failure.
Contracts for health insurance are renegotiated after medical information is known.  Such periodic
recontracting allows new information to enter into the contractual arrangement over time, which
individuals ex ante would choose to keep out.
It is possible to imagine private contracts that solve this problem (Cochrane, 1995; Pauly,
Kunreuther, and Hirth, 1995).  Suppose that people purchase two insurance policies each year; one
to cover their medical costs that year, and a second “premium insurance” policy to cover any
increase in premiums they may face in the future as a result of information learned that year.  Full
premium insurance would give people an amount of money equivalent to the discounted expected
increase in their future medical spending from events that year.
Such premium insurance does not exist; the question is why.  Several factors have been
identified.  Regulatory barriers have been suggested as the culprit (Cochrane, 1995).  Moral hazard
(people with premium insurance would take insufficient care of their health) and adverse selection
(people expecting declines in health would more likely take up the insurance) are possibilities.  The
aggregate risk phenomenon provides a fourth explanation (Cutler, 1996).  Implementing such
contracts requires a lot of information about how changes in health status today affect the entire
future course of expected medical spending.  There is substantial uncertainty in this forecast which
full premium insurance would have to insure against.  But future medical cost changes will be39 Insurers might get around this the way that they do with term life insurance:
guaranteeing the right of renew at then prevailing prices.  But then the value of the insurance
product is limited, as people are locked into one policy.
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common to everyone with the contract.  As a result, insurers will be unable to diversify this risk.
39
For all but the first explanation, private markets will be imperfect, and government intervention is
warranted.  
VII.2 Adverse selection and market failure
The government might respond to the risk segmentation problem by requiring insurers to
offer everyone the same price for each contract.  Many employers who run health systems for their
employees do this.  Indeed, information systems were historically not well enough developed for
insurers to differentiate who was high and low risk; they could only set one price for each group.
This pooling at first glance seems to solve the risk segmentation problem, since everyone
can enroll in each plan at the same terms.  But the solution is illusory.  It moves from a system of
full information to one of asymmetric information: individuals know more than insurers about their
risk types.  In such an situation, market outcomes will again be inefficient.  This analysis was first
demonstrated by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977).
This inefficiency can be demonstrated using Figure 8.  Constrained to charge only one price
per plan, suppose that insurers offer plan C, full insurance at the group average price (assuming
equal numbers of high and low risks).  Plan C is a pooling equilibrium; it fully insures ex ante risk,
thus solving the risk segmentation problem.  But plan C is not stable.  Consider an insurer that came
along and offered a policy that was a bit less generous than plan C but cost less, such as plan D.40 This discussion has been presented in a case where individuals are paying for the cost
of insurance and thus pay less when they join plans with low risk people.  A related situation is
present if all people are given a uniform voucher for insurance.  Then, low risks do not benefit
by having plans for low risks only, but insurers do.  As a result, insurers will design the same
sort of policies.
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Low risk people would choose plan D over plan C; since they are overpaying for insurance, low
risks prefer less generous insurance if they can get it at existing prices.  High risks prefer C to D;
given the implicit subsidy they receive, high risks want full insurance.  As a result, introducing plan
D would break the pooling equilibrium.  Rothschild and Stiglitz and Wilson show that in a
competitive insurance market with two risk types, pooling is not an equilibrium; low risks will never
voluntarily pool with high risks.
There is only one possible equilibrium, shown in Figure 9.  That equilibrium involves high
risks in plan A and low risks in plan F.  Plan A provides full insurance at actuarially fair rates for
high risks.  Plan F is the most generous actuarially fair plan for low risks that is not preferred by the
high risks to plan A. High risks are tempted to join plan F by the low premium, but are discouraged
by the incomplete coverage.  Plan F is just stingy enough to make switching unattractive for high
risks.  Low risks would prefer more generous coverage at their risk-specific cost, but this cannot be
obtained without also pooling with the high risks.
40
There are two inefficiencies in this equilibrium.  First, high risks have to pay more for their
coverage simply because they are high risk, the risk segmentation problem noted above.  Second,
low risks do not obtain full insurance coverage, even though full insurance is optimal.  Plans distort
themselves to attract low risks, in the process reducing the value of their insurance.
In this model, the generosity of insurance coverage is measured by the amount paid in the
sick state; but in practice other dimensions of the plan may be used as screening devices.  For41 Many papers have analyzed equilibrium in such markets.  Some equilibrium concepts
do yield an equilibrium, but in no case is the equilibrium first best efficient.  Wilson (1977) and
Riley (1979) proposed equilibria where insurers do not offer plans if those plans would become
unprofitable if other plans left the market (Wilson) or if other plans entered the market (Riley). 
Grossman (1979) proposes a model where insurers can screen applicants before selling them
insurance, thus limiting losses from high risks.
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example, having good cancer care is likely to appeal to the sick more than the healthy; thus, plans
for  low  risks  will  avoid  such  specialists.  Well baby care or complementary health club
memberships, which appeal to the low risks, would be better.  Even advertizing and location can be
used to select good and bad risks.  
Rothschild and Stiglitz go further and show that even the separating equilibrium may not be
stable.  Figure 9 also shows this situation.  Suppose that instead of an equal mix of low and high
risks, the economy consists almost entirely of low risks.  Thus, the fair odds line for the two risks
together is the dashed line.  Relative to utility at point F, the low risks would prefer a pooled policy
such as G.  The high risks would prefer G as well, since they get a much lower premium and only
somewhat less coverage.  Point G would thus undermine the separating equilibrium.  But the
analysis above still holds; the pooling equilibrium is not stable either.  Thus, with no stable pooling
equilibrium and no stable separating equilibrium, the market will not reach an equilibrium.
41
The simple two-risk example of adverse selection suggests that if an equilibrium exists, high
risks will receive full coverage, while low risks will receive only partial coverage.  Very different,
but still inefficient, equilibria can be achieved with multiple risk types (Feldman and Dowd, 1991;
Cutler and Reber, 1998; and Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1998).  Suppose there are two health plans, a
generous plan and a moderate one.  It is easiest, although not necessary, to think of the generous
plan as a traditional service benefit policy and the moderate plan as a managed care policy.  There
is a continuous distribution of risks in the population, denoted by s.  For simplicity, I take s to be the45 A numerical example illustrates this possibility.  Suppose that the highest cost person
has expected spending of $50,000 and that average costs of the population as a whole in the
moderate policy (with or without this person, if he comprises a small part of the total risk) is
$3,000.  Suppose further that the high cost person values the generous policy at $20,000 more
than the moderate policy, and that he spends only $5,000 less in the moderate policy than with
the generous policy (a 10 percent savings).  Efficiency demands that he should be in the
generous policy; the additional value of that policy ($20,000) is greater than the additional cost
he imposes there ($5,000).  If the high cost person were the only person in the generous policy,
however, the cost of that policy would be $47,000 more than the cost of the moderate policy
($50,000 versus $3,000), which would lead him to opt for the moderate policy.
46 There is an apocryphal story such a situation.  A firm was providing benefits to its
employees and noticed that all plans put a 90 day limit on inpatient care for mental health
benefits.  The employer when to the various insurers and asked about the cost of removing the
cap.  The insurers all replied that they didn’t have such a cap in practice, they just said they did
to discourage people with severe mental health problems from enrolling in their plan!
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from the moderate plan sufficiently large to prompt switching.
45  The disappearance of generous
plans as a result of dynamic processes of adverse selection is termed a “death spiral”.  Thus, in this
example too few people will have generous insurance coverage.
Considering the various equilibria, there are no guarantees about what an equilibrium with
adverse selection will involve, if in fact there is an equilibrium.  But the final equilibrium will
involve potential welfare losses from three sources.  First, people may be in the wrong plans.
Adverse selection prompts people at the margin to enroll in less generous policies, when on the basis
of their own preferences and costs more people would choose generous plans.  Second, plans have
incentives to distort their coverage to attract the low risks and repel the high risks.  This incentive
is present for all plans.  Every plan gains by being less generous, because at the margin it changes
the risk balance towards a lower risk population.  This is true even if every person would be willing
to pay for it at his actuarially fair rate.
46  Third, people pay more for insurance when they are sick
than when they are healthy.  This denies people the ex ante pooling of risk types that people would
want at a fair price.47 The metric to measure adverse selection is not the same in all studies, ranging from the
difference in premiums or claims generated by adverse selection after controlling for other
relevant factors (for example, Price and Mays, 1985; Brown et al., 1993) to the likelihood of
enrollment in a generous plan conditional on expected health status (for example, Cutler and
Reber, 1998) to the predominance of known risk factors among enrollees of more generous
health plans compared to those in less generous plans (for example, Ellis, 1989).
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VII.3 Evidence on the Importance of Biased Enrollment
A substantial literature has looked for biased enrollment in insurance markets, the key to
adverse selection.  This literature is summarized in Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000).  Table 7, taken
from that paper, shows evidence of enrollment differences along three dimensions: traditional
insurance versus managed care; overall levels of insurance coverage; and high versus low option
coverage. 
Most empirical work on adverse selection involves data from employers who allow choices
of different health insurance plans of varying generosity; some of the studies look at the Medicare
market, where choices are also given.  In essentially all of these cases, the data show strong evidence
of adverse selection.
47  Adverse selection is present in the choice between fee-for-service and
managed care plans (8 out of 12 studies, with 2 findings of favorable selection and 2 studies
ambiguous), in the choice between being insured and being uninsured (3 out of 4 studies, with 1
ambiguous finding), and in the choice between high-option and low-option plans within a given type
(14 out of 14 studies).
VII.4 Evidence on the Importance of Plan Manipulation
There are substantially fewer empirical studies on whether plans manipulate their benefits
to attract a healthier mix of enrollees than on biased enrollment.  Plans, of course, differ greatly in
their generosity.  But it is difficult to know how much of this variation reflects manipulation by the48 In Canada, for example, everyone receives health insurance from their provincial
government; there is no choice about the policy and no option to be uninsured.  In the United
Kingdom, a base insurance plan is required for everyone, although people can supplement that
plan with private insurance.
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plans  to  attract  healthy  risks  as  opposed  to  differential  estimates  of the most efficient care
arrangements.  
Though evidence on plan structures is ambiguous, the marketing of managed care plans
shows clear efforts to promote favorable selection.  Maibach et al. (1998) document the marketing
practices managed care plans use to attract healthy Medicare enrollees, including television ads that
show seniors engaged in physical and social activities and marketing seminars held in buildings that
are not wheelchair accessible.  
VII.5  Public policy with heterogeneous risks
Risk segmentation and adverse selection create a clear case for government intervention.
This is unlike moral hazard, where private markets have as much ability to combat the problem as
the government.  Here, the government’s ability to compel certain actions is important.  The most
obvious public solution is to mandate that everyone have insurance, and that they belong to the same
plan.  Mandatory coverage is required to prevent the healthy from declining coverage.  A single plan
is required to prevent sorting by risk.  This solution is termed single payer insurance.  It is the
foundation of many health care systems around the world.
48  Adverse selection was an explicit
concern in the foundation of many public insurance systems.  
Single payer systems have other drawbacks, however.  Universal systems require substantial
income transfers to the poor.  In addition to the political economy difficulty of taxing the rich to give
to the poor, there are efficiency considerations from raising the taxes used to finance the transfers.64
 Further, issues of government efficiency, noted in Section IV in the case of government versus
private provision, are raised here as well.  For these reasons, governments have pursued other
options as well.
A second solution is to regulate some degree of pooling more than private markets alone
would provide.  In the early to mid-1990s, state governments in the United States passed a number
of pieces of legislation to limit risk segmentation.  This was followed by Federal legislation in 1996.
Problems of premium variability are much more acute for small firms than for large firms, since
large firms have an internal risk pool that can be used to smooth spending.  Thus, this legislation
generally applies only to small firms, for example those with fewer than 50 employees.  This
insurance legislation consisted of some or all of the following: limitations on the rates that could be
charged high and low risk purchasers, for example that such rates be no more than 15 percent above
or below average; requirements that insurers guarantee enrollment to new or existing purchasers
seeking to renew; and requirements that people moving from one policy to another policy not face
pre-existing conditions exclusions or length of service requirements before enrollment.
The impact of this legislation has been the subject of some research.  One would expect such
legislation in the first instance to compress premium variability.  This, in turn, might then affect
rates of insurance coverage.  The predicted change in coverage is unclear, however.  On the one
hand, some high risk people whom insurers had previously refused to underwrite or who decided
to be uninsured because of high premiums might now purchase coverage.  On the other hand, some
healthy people could choose not to purchase insurance as their rates increased.  The overall
implications for rates of insurance coverage are not known a priori.
Premium data are much less available than coverage data. Thus, most of the research on the
impact of this legislation has focused on overall rates of insurance coverage. Some studies also65
examine other outcomes, such as who has access to insurance (sick or healthy) and whether small
firms offer insurance to their workers. These studies are summarized in Table 8. The studies use a
variety  of  approaches;  some  use  a  difference-in-differences approach, comparing changes in
insurance coverage in states that adopted reforms at different times; some also compare changes for
small and large firms in states that passed such legislation versus states that did not pass such
legislation. Other studies do more detailed case studies of reforms in particular states. 
A consensus from the studies in Table 8 is that there is no effect or very small effects of
insurance regulation on overall rates of coverage; negative impact on coverage are more commonly
found  in  studies  of  individual  market  regulations, although these effects tend to be small.
Additionally, where the authors attempt to look at the effects of regulations on insurance coverage
by risk type, they often find that rates among the sicker rise, while rates among the healthy fall
somewhat.
There are several possible explanations for a lack of large findings.  One problem has to do
with the scope of the legislation.  States are allowed to regulate purchased insurance but not rates
for firms that self insure.  A small firm that formally purchased insurance can choose, after the
legislation, to self-insure and purchase stop-loss coverage for individual claims exceeding certain
levels.  This alternative insurance arrangement, often through the same insurer, involves little or no
change in risk born by the firm but gets the firm out of the legislative mandate.  A trend towards
self-insurance occurred after these regulations were put in place.
A second explanation is that the legislation was undone by the presence of multiple plans.
While legislation sometimes required insurers to offer all groups the same price for each policy,
groups of healthy employees can still choose less generous policies as a whole and maintain their
lower rates, provided that less healthy groups choose not to enroll in those plans.  In some cases,66
insurers were not required to make all plans available to all firms, thus allowing healthy firms an
option separate from less healthy firms.  In other cases, adverse selection appears to be the source
of the failure.  Buchmueller and DiNardo (forthcoming) show that many firms moved into managed
care plans after such legislation was passed, presumably for adverse selection reasons.  In light of
all the evidence, it thus seems clear that regulation by itself cannot offset the problems resulting
from biased enrollment.  Some other solution is also needed. 
Since the problems of risk segmentation and adverse selection ultimately result from plans
not receiving enough money for high-risk people compared to low risk people, one can think about
subsidizing plans that enroll high risk people as a way to combat this situation.  Figure 11 shows
how a system of subsidies would work.  Starting from the initial separating equilibrium at plans A
and F, consider increasing required payments by the low risks and using the money to lower
required payments by the high risks.  High risks still receive full insurance but have more income
available when sick and healthy; their equilibrium point moves out along the 45 degree line.  As low
risks are made to pay more without receiving additional benefits, their budget constraint rotates
inward.  If the subsidy equalized rates, the equilibrium would be the pooling equilibrium in Figure
8.  
Some amount of subsidy is valued by low risks (Miyazawa, 1977; Spence, 1978).  Although
low risks pay above expected cost to finance the transfer to the sick, the fact that the high risks can
afford insurance at lower cost makes them less likely to opt out of their plan for the low risk plan.
Thus, the healthy can increase the generosity of the policy they choose.  But not all subsidies are so
valued.  For complete equality to be achieved (plan C), the healthy must be mandated to participate
in the system.
This form of differential payment by health status is termed “risk adjustment” (van de Ven49 For example, an employer running an insurance plan in the interests of all of his
employees.
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and Ellis, 2000).  Risk adjustment must be carried out by a government, or a private agency acting
like a government,
49 since given the choice, low risks would not voluntarily enter a risk adjustment
system.
One way to implement risk adjustment is as a voucher system with differential vouchers for
high and low risks.  A sufficiently high voucher for the high risks would be enough to offset their
higher expected costs.  Alternatively, risk adjustment can also be implemented at the plan level.  The
voucher amounts would be equal, but plans would receive subsidies or pay penalties based on the
risk distribution of their enrollees.  Plans with low risks would pay money to plans with high risks.
If governments can risk adjust perfectly, adverse selection can be solved and the first best
achieved.  This is not surprising; it is tantamount to assuming away the information problem that
led to adverse selection in the first place.  Designing such a system in practice is more difficult,
however, because of moral hazard.  Typically, the way that one measures risk status is by looking
at medical care utilization.  People with greater medical claims or more adverse diagnoses are
deemed less healthy.  But such attributes are under the control of the individual and insurer.  If the
government pays more for diabetics, for example, the plan can screen carefully for the disease.  If
the government pays more for very expensive people in general, the incentives to hold down costs
are muted.  This type of moral hazard limits the desired risk adjustment, just as moral hazard limits
optimal risk sharing in the standard case of insurance plan design.
To date, few governments or other organizations have used formal risk adjustment systems
(Keenan, Beeuwkes-Buntin, McGuire, and Newhouse, 2001).  The Medicare program in the United
States has just moved to such a system, however, and more information will be available in coming50 The extent to which costs are fully pooled depends on the degree to which individual
wages reflect individual health insurance costs.  There is strong evidence that employees as a
whole bear health insurance costs, but little evidence about whether this occurs on a worker-by-
worker basis.
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years.  Evaluating the impact of these systems will help guide future policies.
Returning to the discussion of section V, one can view the tax subsidy to health insurance
as an implicit risk adjustment system.  By lowering the price of insurance through employment, the
subsidy  bribes  healthy  people to pool with less healthy people at their workplace.  Since
employment is not perfectly correlated with health, this mutes the impact of poor health status on
insurance premiums.
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VIII.  Combining public and private insurance
The previous section examined the problems inherent when heterogeneous people wish to
choose different health plans.  Without adequate risk adjustment, it was shown that plans might be
insufficiently generous, to avoid attracting high risk people.  To get around this problem, some
countries have mandated that everyone be enrolled in a basic plan that covers services up to a
minimally acceptable level, and then allow people to supplement that package with more generous
insurance if they wish.  This solution seems reasonable on first blush, but it too suffers substantial
problems.  
Private supplemental insurance might take one of three forms.  One type of insurance is for
services that the basic plan does not cover.  For example, Medicare in the United States does not51 The same is true in Canada for the non-elderly population
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cover outpatient prescription drugs,
51 or most long-term care expenses.  Supplemental insurance to
cover uncovered services is allowed in most countries, including the United States.  About half of
the elderly in the United States have private insurance to cover prescription drugs, largely through
Medicaid or a former employer.  
As one might imagine, adverse selection is a substantial problem for such markets.  In the
individual market for insurance coverage to supplement Medicare, for example, very few people buy
packages with pharmaceutical coverage, and those that do pay dearly for the care (Ettner, 1997).
Supplemental insurance for uncovered services also has cost implications for the public sector.
People with coverage for a supplemental service will use more of that service than they would in
the absence of insurance.  This additional service use might increase or decrease use of services
covered  under  the  basic plan, depending on whether covered and uncovered services are
complements or substitutes.  Coverage for prescription drugs in the United States seems to have
relatively little effect on use of physician and hospital services, but the impact of covering other
services such as long-term care could be larger (Cutler, 2000).
A second type of insurance is to pay for cost sharing required under the basic plan. The cost
sharing required under the Medicare program is high: nearly $800 for inpatient care and 20 percent
coinsurance with no stop loss for outpatient care.  At their discretion, Medicare beneficiaries can
obtain supplemental insurance to pay for these out-of-pocket costs.  
This form of supplemental insurance has even clearer cost implications for the government.
People who insure required cost sharing use more services than those who do not.  Some of this
additional utilization is paid for by the public sector.  For example, consider a person who has52 Estimating these additional costs is not straightforward.  The additional utilization of
people with supplemental coverage over those without it is a product of both moral hazard and
adverse selection (since sicker people value supplemental insurance more than healthy people). 
To estimate the importance of moral hazard, one must first back out the share due to adverse
selection or find an instrument for insurance coverage separate from health status.  
53 See Propper and Green (1999) for discussion.
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pneumonia and has the choice of staying in a hospital for observation or staying at home.  Suppose
that the hospital stay will cost $2,000.  If the person faces an $800 deductible, he might choose not
to enter the hospital.  With a supplemental insurance policy covering the deductible, however, the
person enters the hospital.  Only $800 of the additional utilization is paid for by the supplemental
insurer; the remaining $1,200 is paid for by the primary policy.  The supplemental insurance policy
is in effect subsidized by the primary plan.  This subsidy encourages essentially all elderly without
employer-based supplemental insurance or Medicaid to purchase this coverage.  Between Medicaid,
employer-based supplemental insurance, and individually-purchased supplemental insurance, nearly
90 percent of Medicare beneficiaries have eliminated the cost-sharing in the Medicare policy.  The
cost implications of this insurance are large.
52  Christensen and Shinogle (1997), and United States
Physician Payment Review Commission (1996) estimate that people with supplemental insurance
use 20 to 30 percent more Medicare services than those without such coverage. 
The third form of supplemental insurance, and the most controversial,
53 is insurance to pay
for services already covered under the basic package.  The supply-side restrictions on medical
service use imposed in many countries have led to waiting lists for care.  In some cases, people
might have to wait a year or longer for access to non-emergency services.  In the face of these
waiting lines, some people would choose to pay for private insurance (or pay physicians privately)
which would allow them to jump to the front of the queue.  54 Canadians can come to the United States for care.  Such events are relatively rare,
however, and they pay the full cost for the care.
55 The political economy of this type of supplemental insurance has also drawn attention. 
If the rich can opt out of the public system at will, their demand for a high-quality public sector
may decline, potentially leading to an unraveling of support for public insurance (Gouveia,
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This type of insurance can increase total service utilization at low out-of-pocket cost.
Consider a person with a broken hip.  On the public system, the person may face a year wait to visit
an orthopedist, who then schedules surgery several months later.  Supplemental insurance might pay
for an orthopedist visit right away.  The person can then join the smaller waiting list for the surgery
(perhaps moving up in that line, with additional payments to the surgeon), and have the public sector
pay for that care.  For the cost of one orthopedist visit, the person cuts the length of the wait by a
year or more.
The belief that supplemental insurance enables rich people to jump the queue at the expense
of poor people has led to this type of insurance being banned in many countries, such as Canada.
54
In other countries such as the UK, supplementary insurance is allowed and is held by nearly 20
percent of the population.  Still others pay out-of-pocket to jump the queue.  
While those with supplemental insurance certainly benefit from such a system, it is not
obvious that those left behind lose out.  In the orthopedist example, when the person pays the
orthopedist privately, resources are saved by the public plan.  If these resources are used to expand
the supply of medical services, the remaining enrollees in the queue will benefit as well, albeit not
as much as those with private insurance.  In practice, it is not obvious that payments for salaried
physicians adjust in an appropriate manner, and some countries have notorious examples where
physicians abuse the system to collect multiple salaries. In that case, allowing supplemental
insurance could harm those not sufficiently wealthy to afford it.
551997).  But the opposite result may also occur.  The waiting lines the rich face in the absence of
supplemental insurance may diminish their support for public insurance entirely.  Scattered
empirical evidence suggests that the political economy consequences of opting out have been
small (Burchardt, Hills, and Propper, 1999; Globerman and Vining, 1998).  
A further concern is whether having a private sector erodes the monopsony position of
governments.  If being a monopoly purchaser is a key part of how governments hold down
prices, allowing other purchasers will result in increased government costs.  In the short run, this
would be an efficiency loss, as suppliers are paid more for the same product.  Over the long-
term, the welfare consequences depend on the supply elasticity of service provision.  
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IX.  Equity Concerns and Policy for the Poor
Equity concerns dominate many public considerations about health care.  They were a
driving force behind national health insurance in many countries and are a perennial issue in
countries like the United States without a national system.  I start off by characterizing the medical
care utilization of the poor and then turn to the public policy issues.
IX.1 Medical care for the poor in the United States
The main health insurance program for the poor is Medicaid.  Medicaid eligibility is
complex; only a brief summary is presented here (see Gruber, forthcoming, for a detailed discussion
of Medicaid and evidence on its effects).  Traditionally, Medicaid eligibility was tied to receipt of
cash welfare assistance, formerly known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and
currently known as Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).  AFDC eligibility was
restricted to low-income single women with children.  Income cutoffs were generally about 50
percent of the poverty line.  73
In practice, this left out a lot of needy people.  Many pregnant women and young children
were not eligible for Medicaid because of family circumstances (the woman was married or living
with someone) or because they had income slightly above the AFDC eligibility line.  Providing
health insurance for these groups was thought to be particularly valuable, and perhaps even cost
saving, since keeping pregnant women healthy might reduce the occurrence of costly care for
premature birth (Institute of Medicine, 1985).  
As a result, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a dramatic expansion of the
Medicaid program.  Figure 12 shows eligibility rules in 1999.  All pregnant women and infants with
incomes below 133 percent of the poverty line are eligible for Medicaid, independent of whether
they live in a single or dual parent family. At state option, this can be extended to 185 percent of the
poverty line.  Children aged 1 to 5 are eligible for Medicaid up to 133 percent of poverty, and
children aged 6 to 15 are eligible up to the poverty line.  Children aged 16 and older are eligible only
up to lower incomes, about 41 percent of the poverty line, but this is being extended to the poverty
line as the youngest of these children age.  These expansions doubled the share of women eligible
for Medicaid if pregnant and increased the share of children eligible by a third.
More recently, there was a further expansion of health insurance eligibility for children.  The
Child Health Insurance Program (CHIP) was enacted in 1997, with the goal of increasing coverage
to even higher levels of income.  Under the CHIP, states can cover children in families with incomes
below 200 percent of poverty.  The new coverage can be through Medicaid or other systems.  CHIP
enrollment has been relatively slow (less than 2 million children covered within the first two years,
compared to Medicaid coverage of 12 million), however, so there has not been a lot of analysis of
this program to date.
The net impact of these changes is shown in Table 9.  I report health care coverage for the56 There have been some minor changes in the CPS wording about health insurance over
this time period, but they are not sufficiently large to explain the trends shown.
57 The magnitude of this change is large, and it is not completely clear why it all
occurred.
58 Hospitals do receive donations, but donations have fallen over time relative to the costs
of medical care.
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non-elderly population by income in 1986, prior to most of the expansions, and 1998.
56  The table
groups people into three income categories: the poor (income below the poverty line); the near poor
(income between poverty and twice poverty); and the non poor (income above twice poverty).  The
impetus behind the Medicaid expansions is readily apparent; nearly as many people between poverty
and twice the poverty line were uninsured in 1986 as compared with those with lower incomes.  
Medicaid coverage has increased significantly among the near poor – the major expansion
group – from 12 percent to 17 percent of that group.  Medicaid coverage fell among the lowest
income group, as welfare reform and a strong economy moved people off the welfare rolls. 
57
Medicaid coverage has historically been low among the non-poor.  
Being uninsured does not mean that one goes without medical care.  Partly by law and partly
by tradition, hospitals provide care for all people with medical emergencies, whether or not they can
pay.  This ‘uncompensated care’ has been estimated at about 5 percent of total hospital costs.
Physicians provide some care to the uninsured as well, but the amounts are lower. Of course, no care
can be truly uncompensated.
58  Hospitals finance unreimbursed care by charging more to those with
insurance and using those revenues to pay for the uninsured.  
IX.2 Optimal policy for the poor
The central question facing governments is how to design a medical care system for the poor.59 Akerlof compared a program focused on income alone to one also conditioning on
another factor.  The income-only program is effectively a universal one.
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Universal insurance coverage is one option: the government could raise taxes (income, payroll, or
consumption) to finance universal coverage.  The tax and insurance issues involved in this were
discussed above; I do not repeat that discussion here.  A second option is a partial public program.
This is what the United States has pursued through the Medicaid program: some people are eligible
for public insurance but others are not.  Overall coverage is a mix between public insurance, private
insurance, and uninsurance.  
The choice between universal and targeted programs is a classic tradeoff in public finance
(Akerlof, 1978).
59  Because universal programs involve more public spending, the deadweight loss
from taxation is greater.  But partial programs lead to other distortions that universal programs
avoid: people will change their behavior to qualify for a partial program, where they would not need
to do so under the universal system.  Behavioral change might take several forms.  People with
income above the eligibility line might work less than otherwise would, so they qualify for public
insurance.  They might change their family circumstances as well, for example not being married.
Finally, they might drop their private insurance coverage if they are eligible for the public program.
In addition, partial programs have the problem that people may not know about them, and thus may
not use the services at the right time.  
The Medicaid expansions of the late 1980s and 1990s provide an ideal window to examine
these issues.  By extending eligibility to higher income groups and dual parent families, the
expansions encouraged more Medicaid beneficiaries to work and provided incentives for families
to stay together.  On the negative side, they also encouraged higher income people to drop their60 The incidence of employer payments for insurance has been a subject of much debate. 
Theoretical and empirical work generally agree that employees pay for health insurance costs in
the form of lower wages.  But whether this incidence is on a worker-by-worker basis or a more
aggregated level is not clear.  See Gruber (2000) and Krueger and Meyer (2000) for discussion.
61 For simplicity, I ignore the impact of the taxes needed to finance the program.  They
would not alter the conclusions of the analysis.
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private coverage and enroll in Medicaid.
60  This ‘crowding out’ of private coverage has become a
central concern of the literature because it increases the cost of the Medicaid program without
substantial health benefits.  
IX.3 Crowding Out: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Figure 13, taken from Cutler and Gruber (1996a), shows the economics of crowding out.
Health insurance purchase is shown on the vertical axis; spending on other goods and services is on
the horizontal axis.  Indifference curves I1, I2, and I3 show three people with the same income but
different valuations of health insurance.  Person I1 is uninsured, I2 chooses moderate insurance, and
I3 chooses very generous insurance.  
Now suppose the government introduces a free
61 health insurance program offering medical
care at quality m.  The program is designed for people without insurance.  But the program can only
be offered on the basis of income.  Thus, all three people are eligible.  This program is more
appealing than the status quo for both I1 and I2.  The increased insurance coverage of I1 is intended;
I2 has been crowded out of private coverage.  
Crowding out increases the cost to the government of public programs relative to the
benefits. The coverage expansion may have a positive benefit-cost analysis for I1 but a negative
benefit-cost difference when I2 joins the program. 62 See also Cutler and Gruber (1996b,c).
77
Table 9 provides some evidence on the potential magnitude of crowding out.  In 1986, before
the Medicaid expansions, half the near poor population had private insurance.  Roughly one-third
were uninsured.  Thus, unless the Medicaid expansions were carefully designed to discourage those
with private insurance from enrolling, there could be significant crowdout.
A central empirical issue is how extensive this crowding out has been.  Significant research
has been directed to this question, which is summarized in Table 10.  The first study to examine this
question was Cutler and Gruber (1996a).
62  They analyzed the magnitude of crowding out using data
from the 1988-93 Current Population Surveys (CPS).  Different states raised their Medicaid
eligibility criteria at different times, and started from different initial levels of coverage.  Thus, there
is significant geographic variation in the size and timing of the Medicaid expansions.  Cutler and
Gruber used this variation to identify crowding out.  They estimated that crowdout was about 50
percent: for every two people taking up Medicaid, one person left private coverage.  
The surprising magnitude of this finding has sparked a number of additional studies using
different sources of data and methodologies. All of the studies find evidence of crowdout, although
the magnitude of the crowdout varies.  Studies using CPS data, based on repeated cross-sections of
the population and examining cross-state as well as time series variation, tend to give similar
findings to Cutler and Gruber (Shore-Sheppard, 1996).  Studies using the Survey of Income and
Program Participation or the National Longitudinal Survey of Youths, generally following particular
individuals over time, find smaller estimates of crowdout, in the 10 to 20 percent range (Dubay and
Kenney, 1996, 1997; Blumberg, Dubay, and Norton, 2000; Yazici and Kaestner, 1998).  One would
not expect panel data to yield the same estimate of crowdout as repeated cross sections, since it78
examines only whether people drop private coverage when made eligible for Medicaid.  Other
effects could lead to crowdout, since as people not taking up coverage as their income changes.
Whether the differences in results are due to the different methodologies or different data sets is not
generally known.
While most of the studies look at the impact of Medicaid on private insurance, one study
examined whether areas with greater uncompensated care provision had less private insurance
coverage (Rask and Rask, 2000).  Rask and Rask found significant crowdout from these programs.
Crowding out might result from individual decisions to drop coverage or employer decisions
to increase cost sharing or perhaps drop coverage entirely.  Two studies (Cutler and Gruber, 1996a,
and Shore-Sheppard, Buchmueller, and Jensen, 2000) have considered this question.  Although the
effects of Medicaid generosity on cost-sharing and offering care are imprecisely estimated (it is hard
to learn about firm behavior with existing data), both studies suggest that crowding out is a function
of employee decisions to drop coverage more than employer decisions to limit or cancel their
insurance.
The magnitude of crowding out bears directly on welfare loss from the tax exclusion of
employer-provided  health  insurance.  The analysis above highlighted the welfare loss from
excessive moral hazard.  The crowdout evidence suggests a countervailing benefit of the subsidy:
it offsets other incentives to switch to public insurance.  No studies have estimated how the welfare
gain from minimizing crowdout compares to the welfare loss from excessive moral hazard.
IX.4 Medicaid Expansions and Other Behaviors
Crowdout is not the only behavior that may be affected by the Medicaid expansions.  The
expansions increased the ability of women to work and still retain health benefits, and allowed79
women to be married and still collect benefits.  It also reduced the need for precautionary savings
in the event a person became sick.  A smaller body of research has examined the empirical import
of these effects.  In the interests of space, I do not review this literature at length; Gruber (2000) and
Krueger and Meyer (2000) provide detailed summaries.
By allowing women to collect health benefits at higher levels of income, the Medicaid
expansions increased incentives for women to work.  This should result in increased employment
and lower welfare participation among this group of the population.  Several studies have addressed
this issue empirically.  Yelowitz (1995), using the cross-state time series methodology described
above, found significant evidence that labor supply increased with the expansions.  He estimated
that increasing the income cutoff for eligibility by 25 percent of the poverty level increased labor
force participation among low income women by 3 percentage points.  Meyer and Rosenbaum
(2000) find counter evidence, however.  Using the same methodology but a slightly different
measure of eligibility, they find no evidence that labor supply increased after the expansions.  Ham
and Shore-Sheppard (1999) find evidence that Medicaid expansions led some women to leave
welfare for work.  Thus, the overall evidence on welfare and work decisions is mixed.
Less evidence has been directed at how Medicaid expansions affect marriage, fertility, and
savings.  Yelowitz (1998) finds that the Medicaid expansions increased the share of women who got
married, consistent with the expansion of coverage to dual-parent families.  Joyce, Kaestner, and
Kwan (1998) find that Medicaid increases fertility rates, presumably by making the cost of birth and
subsequent medical care cheaper.  The increase in fertility comes about largely as a result of reduced
abortions (Joyce and Kaestner, 1996).  Finally, Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) present evidence that
savings falls by 16 percent in families made eligible for Medicaid, consistent with reduced need for
precautionary savings.  The research on all of these issue is just beginning, however. 80
IX.5 Medicaid Expansions and Health Outcomes
The primary goal of the Medicaid expansions was to improve the health of the poor.  Thus,
they ultimatley need to be evaluated along that margin.  Several studies, shown in Table 11, have
estimated the health impacts of Medicaid expansions.  
The evidence suggests the health benefits are relatively modest.  Piper et al. (1990), Haas
et al. (1993), and Joyce (1999) look at the effect of Medicaid expansions on health in particular
states or cities – Tennessee, Massachusetts, and New York City respectively.  The first two studies
find no impact of the expansions on health; Joyce finds a modest positive impact.  Other studies
have taken a national approach.  Currie and Gruber (1996a, b) and Kaestner, Joyce, and Racine
(2001) use the cross-state and time series methodology described above to evaluate the health
impacts of the Medicaid expansions.  Currie and Gruber find small but statistically significant
improvements in health following the Medicaid expansions.  Kaestner et al. find weak, if any,
support for the hypothesis of improved health.  
Even relatively modest health benefits might be worth it if the value of life is high.  Only one
study has explicitly done a cost-effectiveness analysis for the Medicaid expansions (Currie and
Gruber, 1996a).  Currie and Gruber estimate that the Medicaid expansions had a cost-effectiveness
ratio of roughly $1 million per life, considering only the mortality impact.  While this is relatively
high, in comparison to the Viscusi (1993) summary of the value of a life ($3 million to $7 million
for a middle-aged person), the Medicaid expansions seem to be worth it.  Thus, at least some studies
find that the Medicaid expansions did have a positive benefit in mortality impacts alone, although
the rate of return is not enormously high.
Some explanation for why the health benefits are not larger is provided by Piper et al. (1990).
They show that many women did not enroll in Medicaid for prenatal care until very late in the81
pregnancy – often at the time of delivery.  Thus, they were missing much of the prenatal care that
may have the highest cost-effectiveness ratio (Institute of Medicine, 1985).  This may be a result of
the incremental nature of the program: information about program eligibility may only diffuse over
time, and eligibility rules are complex.  A universal system might increase utilization of services
more.
The finding of very late use of services, in turn, suggests an important reason why the
estimated  cost-effectiveness  analysis  presented  above  may  be  understated.  The Medicaid
expansions provided hospitals with additional revenue they would not otherwise have had – the
reimbursement for a delivery that used to be uncompensated.  To the extent that these revenue
increases led hospitals to provide high quality care more generally, the benefits of this additional
care for health should be accounted for as a benefit fo the expansions.  Only one study has traced
how the Medicaid funds were used.  Duggan (2000) shows that hospitals receiving a large amount
of money from the Disproportionate Share Hospital Program (DSH) of Medicaid generally saved
those funds in the short-term, adding them to balance sheet assets.  It will be important to trace
through the effects of these funds over time.  If used well, it may be that public programs have a
more favorable benefit-cost analysis than the individual calculations suggest.
X. Intergenerational Aspects of Medical Care
While most analysis has focused on the intragenerational aspects of medical care programs,
there are intergenerational consequences to these programs as well.  Public medical care systems
are almost always financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.  Medicare in the United States, for example,
is predominantly pay as you go, with a small surplus currently but the prospect of large deficits63 Rates of return are extremely high for the very oldest cohorts because they paid so little
into the system but get a lot out.  For this reason, we do not report rates of return for cohorts
prior to those born in 1910.
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looming.  
Pay as you go systems involve substantial intergenerational transfers.  Generations alive
when these systems were created or when the benefits expanded rapidly receive large benefits, while
future generations bear the cost.  A few studies in the literature have attempted to estimate the
magnitude  of  these  intergenerational  transfers  (Steuerle and Bakija, 1997; United States
Congressional Budget Office, 1997; Gokhale and Kotlikoff, 1999; Cutler and Sheiner, 2000).  Most
of this research has focused on the intergenerational aspects of the Medicare program in the United
States.   
Figure 14, taken from Cutler and Sheiner (2000) presents the most recent set of estimates.
Cohorts born around 1920, and thus reaching Medicare eligibility around 1985, are expected to
receive net benefits of over $60,000 from Medicare.  Cohorts born today are expected to pay more
into the system than they receive out.  The rates of return are also high for older cohorts.  The 1910
cohort is expected to receive a rate of return of over 25 percent, compared to 2.2 percent for cohorts
born in 1980.
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These estimates use the assumptions of the Medicare actuaries, which project that medical
cost increases will slow down in the next 25 years to the growth rate of the economy as a whole.
Young cohorts today therefore pay for the rapid cost growth experienced by older cohorts but do
note receive benefits from rapid growth themselves.  An alternative projection allowing medical cost
growth to continue avoids the very large losses for current young populations.  But these groups still
fare worse than the cohorts that were elderly or near elderly when the program was implemented.83
Appropriate government policy towards this intergenerational distribution is a broader
question than just Medicare policy, involving issues of savings and labor market behavior, among
other behaviors.  I do not pursue these issues at length here.
XI.  Conclusions
As this brief (!) tour through the health sector indicates, the public policy issues raised by
health care are vast.  I conclude by highlighting what has been learned and providing some direction
for future research.
At the most basic level, governments are involved in what people do to themselves –
smoking and drinking on the bad side, exercise and eating well on the good.  One concern about
such behaviors is the externalities they impose; financial and health consequences need to be
considered.  ‘Internalities’ may be important as well; there are many reasons to think smokers
themselves would be better off if induced not to smoke.  The literature has made substantial progress
on the externality question, but much less progress has been made on the internality question.  Since
the potential magnitude of internal damages dwarfs the magnitude of external damages, more
research on this question is a clear priority.
Once an individual becomes sick, the medical system takes over.  Governments face a first
choice about how to provide medical services: through the public or private sector.  The answer is
complex.  Private firms respond to incentives more rapidly than public firms, but the incentives need
to be the right ones for the system to be efficient.  The wealth of different delivery systems in the
United States and abroad creates a host of experimental situations to help judge the appropriate
delivery system for medical care.  Empirical research on this question is a clear need.84
In every country, the government is involved in influencing the health insurance that people
receive.  In designing such policies, the second best is the goal.  More generous insurance increases
the gains from risk sharing but also the losses from moral hazard.  The optimal policy balances the
marginal insurance gains against the marginal moral hazard losses.  An individual in isolation
designing such a policy for himself would get the tradeoff right.  But government may be involved
where it is not warranted.  By subsidizing employer-provided insurance at the expense of out-of-
pocket spending, the Federal government in the United States encourages more generous insurance,
and perhaps too much moral hazard.  The ‘perhaps’ is key, however; the tax benefits of insurance
may encourage valuable innovation, may offset other public subsidies encouraging people to be
uninsured, or may encourage risk pooling at the expense of adverse selection.  Understanding the
total impact of the tax subsidy through all of these channels is still to be done.
Putting health insurance in a market creates even more problems.  People with different
health risks want different insurance plans; low risks will not voluntarily subsidize high risks.  As
a result, the market will attempt to segregate the two groups, either explicitly (by charging high risks
more than low risks) or implicitly (by encouraging low risks to move to less generous plans to avoid
the high risks).  The problems from such attempts are three-fold: the less healthy will pay more for
insurance the healthy, denying people the ex ante risk pooling that they would want; people are
encouraged to join plans that are less generous than they would prefer if they faced actuarially fair
prices, because such switching saves them from subsidizing the high risks; and plans will have
incentives to make their policies less generous, so as to discourage high risks from enrolling.  
At the extreme, governments may respond to these problems by mandating insurance in a
common plan at a common price.  Short of this, the government might enact regulatory barriers to
segregation  or  put  in  place  financial incentives for the sick and healthy to remain together.85
Empirical evidence on the effects of these policies is not entirely clear; policy action is now awaiting
such knowledge.
Finally, governments are involved in distributional issues for the poor, as they always are.
Equity in health care is valued more than equity in most other markets; as the saying goes, health
care is a right and not a good.  Equity is a bigger problem in countries without universal coverage
than in those with universal coverage; the United States struggles with equity more than most other
developed countries.  In recent years, the United States has had incremental expansions of coverage
for the poor.  These programs have been effective, but marginally so.  The costs are high and the
benefits only modest.  Learning how to design such programs is a key question facing the public
sector.  This question is particularly pressing because medical care markets are changing so rapidly.
The rise of managed care and cutbacks in government payments are squeezing profits from medical
care providers.  The impact these policies will have on the implicit subsidy system for the poor is
worrisome.
Some evidence of the sheer diversity of opinion about public policy for health care is
provided by the recent debate about Medicare in the United States.  Some look at Medicare and see
an inefficient, government-provided insurance system.  Thus, one contingent supports a voucher
system in the hopes that plan competition will eliminate wasteful spending from the program (Aaron
and Reischauer, 1995).  A second group considers the lack of adequate benefits the major problem
with Medicare.  The poor elderly are faced with high cost sharing, and those without employer-
provided supplemental insurance or Medicaid are often uninsured for prescription drugs.  Thus, this
group favors expanding the Medicare package and promoting increased service use (Moon, 1996).
Finally, some see the high and rising cost of Medicare as the central problem.  Increased Medicare
spending worsens the Federal budget and reduces national saving.  Thus, a third group favorsshifting the costs of the current system to the elderly, or forcing middle aged people to save more
for medical care needs when they are retired (Gokhale and Kotlikoff, 1999; Feldstein, 1999).  Each
of these positions is credible in its own right, but the solutions are diametrically opposed.  In perhaps
no other area of public finance is the range of differing policy prescriptions so great.
This broad range of questions demands serious research attention.  Which direction should
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tThe sample is people with private (employer or individual) insurance
Source: Data are from Lewin-VHI.








































































































    Medicare Age 65+; Blind/disabled;
people with kidney failure
14% 37% 21%
    Medicaid Non-elderly poor; Blind and
disabled; Medicare cost
sharing for poor elderly;
Nursing home costs for
chronically impaired
10 8 9








    Non-group Families 3 2
Uninsured 12 4 21*
Source: 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Study (MEPS).
The fourth column is total spending for people with each type of insurance.  The fifth
column is total medical care spending accounted for by that plan.  
* Total out-of-pocket medical spending.Table 3: External Costs of Smoking and Drinking and Optimal Sin Taxes
Paper  (date) Methodology  Costs Included Results 
Smoking
Manning et al. (1989, 1991)  Construct group of “non-smoking”
smokers who are similar to smokers in
terms of age, sex, education, drinking
habits, etc. but have never smoked.
Estimate and compare spending
profiles for hypothetical profiles of
men and women with and without
smoking.
Medical care, sick leave, group life
insurance, nursing home, retirement
pension, fires, taxes to finance above
programs
Estimate of external costs is sensitive
to discount rate; range from -$0.91 per
pack (0 percent discount rate) to $0.24
per pack (10percent discount rate), in
1986 dollars.
Viscusi (1995) Similar to Manning et al.; updates
many of the estimates using more
recent data; accounts for falling tar
content of cigarettes.
Medical care, sick leave, group life
insurance, nursing home care,
retirement pensions, fires, taxes on
earnings, environmental tobacco
smoke (ETS) related lung cancer and
heart disease
Net external costs to society excluding
the effects of ETS are -$0.32 to -
$0.23; including effect of ETS,
estimates rise to as much as $0.41.
Evans, Ringel, and Stech (1999) Similar to Manning et al.; expand
analysis to include additional costs.
ETS-related low birthweight, SIDS
deaths, infant mortality and fetal loss;
do not do additional analysis but
include costs from Manning et al. And
Viscusi
The external costs of smoking range
from $0.42 to $0.72 per pack in 1994.
SUMMARY
Estimates depend critically on the
discount rate assumed and especially
on whether the costs of ETS-related
deaths due to heart disease, lunch
cancer and maternal smoking are
considered.Table 3 (cont)
Paper  (date) Methodology  Costs Included Results 
Drinking
Pogue and Sgontz (1989) Develop theoretical model of optimal
alcohol taxes; tax depends on relative
elasticity of demand for abusers and
non-abusers, fraction of alcohol
consumed by abusers, and external
costs associated with drinking
Use existing estimates of elasticities
and external costs to estimate optimal
tax.
Depending on assumptions about
relative elasticities, alcohol tax (in
1983) ranges from about right to half
the optimal level. “Best guess” is that
optimal tax is twice actual tax.
Manning et al. (1989, 1991) Same as for cigarettes (described
above).
Medical care, sick leave, group life
insurance, nursing home, retirement
pension, taxes on earning, motor
vehicle accidents, costs associate with
the criminal justice system 
External costs less sensitive to
discount rate than for cigarettes; range
from 1.08 to 1.56 per excess ounce of
alcohol . Forty percent of
consumption is excess ounces,
implying an external cost per ounce of
about $0.48.
Kenkel (1996) Estimates elasticities for moderate and
heavy drinkers using cross-sectional
variation (at state level) in prices.
Uses 1985 Health Interview Survey.
Uses estimates from Manning (1989)
plus external costs of the risks drunk
drivers create for others.
Current alcohol taxes are too low
(about half) the optimal tax; stricter
drunk driving laws and information
provisions would reduce optimal tax.
SUMMARY
Current alcohol tax is well below







99+ percent 27.5% $56,459
95-99 percent 27.7 14,271
90-95 percent 14.0 5,778
70-90 percent 21.2 2,186
<70 percent 9.6 281
Average $2,060
Source: Data are from the 1996 Medical
Expenditure Panel Study (MEPS).Table 5: The Elasticity of Demand for Insurance
Paper  (date) Data (Years) Empirical Strategy Results
Price Elasticity of Demand for Firm Insurance Offering
Helms, Gauthier, and Campion
(1992)
Pilot programs Analyzes firm responses to pilot
program providing subsidies to firms
to offer insurance 
Finds wide range of responses across
sites; elasticities of -0.4 to -1.1.
Thorpe, et al. (1992) Pilot program in New York Analyses firm response to 50%
subsidy to the price of insurance for
small firms.
Actual elasticity of -0.07; estimate
elasticity would have been -0.33 if
all firms were aware of the program.
Leibowitz and Chernew (1992) Health Insurance Association of
America survey of firms (1989)
Models offering decision as a
function of premiums (variation
across areas) and tax subsidy for
small firms. Average marginal tax
rates for firms are imputed based on
CPS.
Elasticity of -0.8 for premiums and -
2.9 for tax subsidies.
Gentry and Peress (1994) Occupation Compensation Survey
(1988-1992)
Models cross-city differences in the
average share of workers offered
insurance as a function of the state
after-tax price of insurance.
The percentage of workers offered
insurance declines by 1.8 percent for
a 1 percentage point increase in the
price of insurance.
Morrisey, Jensen, and Morlock
(1994)
Survey of small firms (1993) Use small firms’ answers to
hypothetical questions about whether
they would offer insurance at
different prices.
Elasticity of offering of -0.92.
Feldman, Dowd, Leitz, and Blewett
(1997)
Sample of Minnesota firms (1993) Imputes premiums to firms not
offering coverage. Models offering
as a function of premiums in cross-
section.
Price elasticities of -3.9 for single
coverage and -5.8 for family
coverage 
Royalty (2000) CPS of Employee Benefits (1988,
1993)
Models offering as a function of tax
subsidy. Uses cross-state variation in
marginal tax rates to identify
elasticity.
Elasticity of -0.68 across all
employers.Table 5 (continued)
Paper  (date) Data (Years) Empirical Strategy Results
Marquis and Long (2001) Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
Employer Health Insurance Survey
(firms in 10 states) (1993)
Imputes premiums to firms not
offering coverage. Models offering
as a function of premiums in cross-
section.
40 percent reduction in premiums
would inclrease offering by 2 to 3
percentage points. 
Finkelstein (forthcoming) Canadian Social Survey (1991,1994) Models (supplemental medical)
insurance offering as a function of
after-tax price. DD comparing
change in offering of insurance
before and after repeal of tax subsidy
in Quebec to change in  rest of
Canada.
Elasticity of about -0.50.
SUMMARY -0.14 to -5.8
Price Elasticity of Demand for Insurance Spending
Long and Scott (1982) Current Population Reports and
Employment and Earnings (1947-
1979)
Time series analysis of fringe benefit
share of income as a function of
marginal tax rates.
A 10 percent increase in marginal tax
rates increases the share of
compensation devoted to health
insurance by 4.1 percent.
Taylor and Wilensky (1983) National Medical Care Expenditure
Survey (1977)
Individual-level analysis of
premiums as a function of price
(measured as 1 minus the marginal
tax rate), income, and demographic
controls
Price elasticity is -0.21; income
elasticity is 0.02.Table 5 (continued)
Paper  (date) Data (Years) Empirical Strategy Results
Woodbury (1983) Employee Compensation in the
Private Nonfarm Economy (biennial,
1966-1974), Census of Governments
(1977)
Estimates demand for non-wage
compensation as a function of
imputed marginal tax rates; unit of
observation is a employee group-
establishment-size cell (4 employee
groups and 3 establishment sizes).
Also estimates similar equations with
school district as until of
observation.
Elasticity of demand for fringe
benefits ranging from -1.2 to -3.0.
Holmer (1984) Health insurance choices of Federal
employees selecting family coverage
(1982)
Estimates discrete choice model of
health insurance demand as a
function of income and marginal tax
rate.
Average price elasticity of demand
for more generous health insurance
of -0.16; income elasticity of 0.01.
Vroman and Anderson (1984) National Medical Care Expenditure
Survey - Employer Health Insurance
Cost Survey (1977)
Cross-sectional analysis of health
insurance spending per eligible
employee; firm is unit of
observation. Independent variables
are the average effective marginal
tax rate, loading factors (based on
firm size), wages, and region
dummies. 
Loading factors are consistently
significant and negative. Mixed
results for effects of tax rates. In full
sample, 10 percent increase in
effective tax rate is associated with
7.4 percent increase in employer-
based insurance coverage; effects of
tax rates are insignificant when
sample is split by wages.
Sloan and Adameche (1986) Survey of Employer Expenditures for
Employee Compensation (1968,
1972, 1977); March CPS 
Analyzes employer contributions to
life-health insurance and private
pension plans (per worker and as a
fraction of compensation); imputes
average marginal tax rate for firm
from March CPS.
Tax elasticity of 1.7 for life-health
insurance per worker-hour and 0.6
for payments as a fraction of total
compensation.Table 5 (continued)
Paper  (date) Data (Years) Empirical Strategy Results
Turner (1987) NIPA, Statistics of Income (1954-
1979)
Time series analysis of share of labor
income going to benefits, including
health insurance, as a function of
average marginal tax rate, controlling
for demographics.
Changes in tax rates can explain less
than 5 percent of the growth in the
share of income going to fringe
benefits.
Woodbury and Hamermesh (1992) Panel of compensation and benefits
for faculty at 1477 institutions (1984-
85, 1988-89)
Estimate demand for fringe benefits
among faculty as a function of
average imputed marginal tax rate
(with controls); also use instrument
capturing variation due to year-state-
specific tax rules; also estimate
models with school fixed effects.
Significant negative effect of relative
price of fringe benefits (due to
differential tax treatment) on fringes’
share of compensation; estimates are
twice as large in absolute value for
IV and fixed-effects specifications,
compared to OLS.
SUMMARY -0.2 to -1.0
Price Elasticity of Demand for Insurance Coverage by Individuals
Marquis and Phelps (1987) Rand Health Insurance Experiment
individual questionaire
Uses individuals responses to
questions about willingness to pay
for supplementary coverage.
Elasticity of demand for
supplementary insurance of -0.6.
Gruber and Poterba (1994) Current Population Survey (1985-96,
1988-89)
Uses change in tax treatment of
insurance for the self-employed to
identify elasticity. DD comparing
change in coverage among self-
employed and employed before and
after TRA86.
Elasticity of up to -1.8.
Marquis and Long (1995) SIPP (1987) and May and March
CPS (1988)
Uses cross-area variation in
insurance premiums to identify
responsiveness of demand for
individual policies to price.
Elasticity of -0.3 to -0.4.Table 5 (continued)
Paper  (date) Data (Years) Empirical Strategy Results
Chernew, Frick, and McLaughlin
(1997)
Small Business Benefits Survey
(1992, 1993)
Estimates probit regressions of
demand for health insurance among
low-income workers in small firms;
price is employee contribution to
premium. 
Elasticity of demand for employer-
provided coverage for those offered
coverage (take-up) with respect to
employee share of -0.09.
SUMMARY -0.6 to -1.8
Price Elasticity of Demand for Plan Switching
Welch (1986) BLS Level of Benefits Study (1981-
82)
Models HMO market share at
employer as a function of out-of-
pocket premium in cross-section.
Elasticity of demand for HMO
(relative to conventional insurance) -
0.6 with respect to out-of-pocket
premiums.
Feldman, Finch, Dowd, and Cassou
(1989)
Survey of employees in 20
Minneapolis firms (1984)
Models individual plan choice  as a
function of out-of-pocket premiums,
plan characteristics, and individual
characteristics.
Plan choice is very sensitive to out-
of-pocket premiums. A $5 (1984$)
increase in out-of-pocket premium
can causes a plan to lose 40 percent
of its market share.
Dowd and Feldman (1994) Panel data on employees’ health plan
choices in 5 Twin Cities employers
(1988-1993)
Models plans’ market share at an
employer as a function of relative
out-of-pocket premium. Includes
firm, plan, type of coverage, and year
fixed effects.
Elasticity of demand for more
generous plan with respect to out-of-
pocket premium of -7.9 for single
coverage.
Buchmueller and Feldstein (1997) Panel data on UC Berkeley
employees’ health plan choices
(1993-1994)
Compare plan switching among
employees experienced increases in
out-of-pocket premiums due to
employer pricing reform to those
whose premiums were unchanged. 
Employees facing $10 increase in
out-of-pocket premiums were5 times
as likely to switch plans as those
with constant premiums.Table 5 (continued)
Paper  (date) Data (Years) Empirical Strategy Results
Cutler and Reber (1998) Panel data on Harvard employees’
health plan choices (1994-1996)
Compare plan switching behavior of
employees affected by changes in
out-of-pocket premiums to those not
affected.
Elasticity of demand for generous
plan of -0.6 with respect to out-of-
pocket premium (elasticity of -2 with
respect to total premium).
Royalty and Soloman (1999) Panel data on Stanford employees’
health plan choices supplemented
with employee survey (1993-1995)
Multinomial logit model of plan
choice as a function of out-of-pocket
premium and individual
characteristics.
Own-price elasticity of -0.2 to -0.5
(elasticity of -1 to -1.8 with respect
to total premium). 
SUMMARY Wide variability, generally greater
than elasticity of offeringTable 6: Estimates of the Elasticity of Demand for Medical Care

























Rosenthal (1970) 1962 sample of New
England hospitals


























































































Beck (1974) random sample of
poor population of
Saskatchewan














Phelps and Newhouse (1974) insurance plans in







Newhouse and Phelps (1976) 1963 CHAS survey








(hospital),        
-0.42
(physician)















-0.11 -0.039Table 6 (continued)























acute hospital care dynamic
intertemporal model
-1.2






(hospital),        
 -0.17 to -0.22
(outpatient)
Bhattacharya et al. (1996) 1990 Japanese
Ministry of Health
and Welfare survey 
outpatient visits Cox proportional
hazards model
-0.22 























SUMMARY -0.20 -0.05 to -0.15
Note: See Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) for details.Table 7: Evidence on Biased Enrollment in Health Insurance
Paper Data Empirical Methods Highlights of Results Selection
Selection Between Managed Care and Indemnity Plans
Bice (1975) East Baltimore public
housing residents (random
sample)
tests of means of health
status variables by
Medicaid enrollment
poor health and high expected use of
medical services is positively correlated
with enrollment in prepaid plans;








of plan choice (note
dependent variable is
binary)
fee-for-service patients are older and
more likely to be single or without
children
adverse
Eggers (1980) Group Health Cooperative





sample from Medicare 20
Percent (Part A) and 5
Percent (Part B) Research
Discharge Files
Length of stay 25 percent higher for
non-GHC patients; inpatient













lower family self-reported health status
results in significantly less chance of
selecting HMO enrollment
adverse





health plan choice given
some plan is chosen
women are less likely to join the prepaid
health plan than men, but no significant




11 employee groups from
Minneapolis-St. Paul Blue
Cross and Blue Shield,
1978-81





HMO joiners averaged 53 percent fewer
inpatient days before joining than those
who chose to stay in FFS
adverseTable 7 (continued)
Paper Data Empirical Methods Highlights of Results Selection
Griffith, Baloff, and
Spitznagel (1984)
physician visits in the




high usage rates at managed care plan's







data from Salt Lake City
and Tallahassee
tests of means in plan
populations and logit
regression of health plan
choice
HMO joiners are younger, more often
male, less likely to use psychiatric
services, but have more chronic













non-enrollees' reimbursements are 44
percent higher than enrollees in two years
before capitation; disenrollees have worse
past health
adverse
Brown et al. (1993) Medicare spending for
enrollees who stayed in
traditional system versus
those who moved into
managed care
Comparison of spending
in the two years prior to
HMO enrollment 
enrollees who switch to managed care
had 10 percent lower spending than













and capitated HMO care
HMO patients are 5.7 percent costlier favorable
Altman, Cutler and
Zeckhauser (1998)





analysis of costs among
individuals with different
plan choice histories
adverse selection accounts for
approximately 2 percent of differences
between indemnity and HMO plan costs
adverse
SUMMARY adverseTable 7 (continued)
Paper Data Empirical Methods Highlights of Results Selection





OLS and 2SLS estimation
of health insurance
purchases
ambulatory care expenditures have an








types of managed care
comparison of costs and
disenrollment rates for
insurees
disenrollees have lower inpatient costs
and occupy less risky demographic










disenrolling from each of
three HMOs
likelihood of disenrollment rises
significantly with increases in relative








individuals who are younger, male, or in
"excellent" self-reported health are
significantly less likely to become insured
adverse
SUMMARY adverse




1980 random sample of
claims and eligibility data





models for premiums and
total expenditures
worse self-perceived dental health
corresponds to higher valuation of
insurance; experience rating does not
always lower premiums
adverse
Ellis (1985) 1982-83 employee health
plan enrollment and
expense records of a large
firm
logit estimates of health
plan choice
age and worse previous year's health
expenses are associated with choice of
more generous health coverage for the
next year
adverseTable 7 (continued)
Paper Data Empirical Methods Highlights of Results Selection
Dowd and Feldman
(1985)
survey data from 20
Minneapolis-St. Paul firms
tests of means of
characteristics of health
plan populations
fee-for-service patients are older and
more likely have serious medical









indices across plans and
years
patient risk in high option indemnity and
fee-for-service plans increases faster than







comparison of costs and
premiums across plan
choices
high option Blue Cross plan undergoes a
premium spiral with enrollment cut in









families in highest expenditure quartile
were 42 percent more likely to obtain
supplementary insurance than those in
lowest quartile
adverse
Ellis (1989) claims and enrollment data






employees in high option plan are 1.8
years older, 20.1 percent more likely to






survey of employee health
insurance programs at 7
Minneapolis firms
nested logit for plan
selection
age varies positively with selection of a
(relatively generous) IPA or FFS
single-coverage health plan
adverse
Welch (1989) Towers, Perrin, Forster,




between high and low
option Blue Cross plans
for government workers
high-option premium is 79 percent higher
than low option
adverseTable 7 (continued)
Paper Data Empirical Methods Highlights of Results Selection
Marquis (1992) plan selection of families







73 percent more individuals in high risk
quartile choose most generous plan than
those in low risk quartile, even with
age/sex/experience rating
adverse
Van de Ven and Van
Vliet (1995)
survey and claims data
from 20,000 families
insured by largest Dutch
insurer, Zilveren Kreis
regression of risk factors
on prediction error of
difference in costs
between members of
high- and low-cost plans.
age- and sex-composition of plans
explain 40 percent of error in predicted










two high-option plans suffered fatal
premium spirals in a six-year period; a
third was transformed from FFS into POS




claims and enrollment data
from Harvard University
calculation of welfare
loss and simulation of
long-run effects of
changes in health plan
prices
adverse selection creates a welfare loss
equal to 2 percent of baseline health
spending; price responses in long run are













employees in GIC's FFS plan spend 28
percent more, are older, and have




Note: See Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) for details.Table 8: Effects of Small-Group and Individual Market Regulation 










small firms in California
versus the rest of the nation
Effect of California law requiring
guaranteed issue, rate bands, and
pre-existing condition limitations
13 percentage point increase in share
of California firms offering insurance
Marsteller, et al. (1998) March CPS (1989-
1995)








Small group and individual
market regulations on issue and
rating.
Significant positive effect of small
group issue reforms on coverage
rates (strongest effects for
guaranteed issue); negative effect of
rating reforms; these effects are
offsetting in states with both reforms.
Reforms in individual market were
associated with statistically
significant decreases in coverage.
Sloan and Conover
(1998)
CPS (1989-1994) Cross-state changes in
insurance coverage, public-
private mix of coverage, and
group-non group coverage
for employees in small firms
compared to large firms
Mandates; low cost plans; high
risk pools; open enrollment; rate
bands
Mandates lower coverage by 4
percent.  No other policies affect
overall insurance coverage;
Community rating leads to less
private and more public coverage,
and more coverage for the old in
comparison to the young.




small firms’ decision to offer
insurance as a function of






Small positive relationship between
regulations and percent of firms
offering coverage (3-4 percentage
points). Small, negative effect for
more recent reforms.Table 8 (continued)












small firms’s offering of
health insurance as logit.
Cross-sectional analysis
using 4 years of data;
includes region dummies and
other controls. Variation in
policy variables is at the state
level.
Guaranteed issue, guaranteed
renewal, portability of coverage,
pre-existing conditions, rating
restrictions (rating restriction
dummies are not included in
model due to collinearity).
No significant effect of regulations





DD at state-level; analyzes
“packages” of reforms that
tended to adopted together.
Dependent variables are
uninsurance rate and rate of
private coverage.
Separate analyses of regulation of




and individual market (same
expect not poratbility).
No statistically significant effect of
reforms on coverage in small group
market. Individual market reforms
have positive, statistically significant
effect on uninsurance and negative,
statistically significant effect on
private insurance rate.
Hall (2000) Case studies of
reforms in a number
of states.
Case studies. Variety of reforms in small group
and individual markets.
Reforms have improved access for
high-risks at high cost; little effect of
small-group reforms on insurance
offering; negative effect of individual
reforms (guaranteed issue, pure
community rating) on coverage. 
Simon (1999a) CPS (1992-1997) Cross-state changes in
insurance coverage for small
firms versus large firms 
Full reform (guaranteed issue and
rate bands); Partial reform (rate
bands only); Barebones (require-
ment to offer basic plan to
uninsured)
Full reforms reduced coverage by 1.9
percentage points; Decline of 6.4
percentage points for low risk
workers (young, never married men);
Statistically insignificant increase for
high risk workers (married women
while children); No effect of partial
reforms or barebones package on
coverageTable 8 (continued)
Paper  (date) Data (Years) Empirical Strategy Reforms Examined Results













small versus large firms
Full reform (guaranteed issue and
rate bands); Partial reform (rate
bands only); Barebones (require-
ment to offer basic plan to
uninsured)
Full reform increased single
premiums by 4 percent (marginally
significant), increase in employee
contribution is 65 percent of total
premium increase. No significant
effect of full or partial reform on
offering. Full reform has statistically
significant negative effect on
coverage; negative (insignificant)
effect on take-up.
Kapur (2000a) CPS (1991-1999) Difference-in-differences
across states comparing who
is hired in small firms with
health insurance by measures
of expected medical
spending.
Strong reform (guaranteed issue,
rate bands, portability); Moderate
reform (only some of these
factors); and no reform
Portability and rating reforms have
offsetting effects on employment,
with no net change in who is hired in
small firms.
Kapur (2000b) NMES (1987) and
MEPS (1996)
Examines employment
changes by firm size
conditional on being offered
health insurance
Regulations making it hard for
insurers to deny coverage or
exclude pre-existing conditions
Conditions that were a cause for
denial in 1987 did not lead to
employment distortions but did in
1996, consistent with such conditions






Trends in enrollment in Blue
Cross and IHCP
Establishment of Individual
Health Coverage Program in New
Jersey
IHCP may have prevented a





NY, PA, and CT 
Difference-in-difference
comparing small and large
firms in New York versus the
other states
Implementation of community
rating in New York
Large shift to managed care in New
York; no change in insurance
coverage overall.
SUMMARY No or small effect of regulations on
insurance coverageTable 9: Insurance Coverage by Income in the Non-Elderly United States Population
1986 1998
Income Private Public Uninsured Private Public Uninsured
< Poverty  12% 42% 45% 24% 40% 36%
Poverty - 2 x Poverty 50 12 38 52 17 31
> 2 x Poverty  80 3 17 85 3 12
Source: Data are from the March 1987 and 1999 Current Population Surveys.Table 10: Effect of Public Health Insurance Programs on Private Coverage
Paper  (date) Data (Years) Empirical Strategy Results
Dubay, Norton, and Moon (1995) American Hospital Association
Annual Survey (1987-90); March
CPS (1988, 1991); HCFA Area
Resource File
Estimate effects of Medicaid
expansions on uncompensated care
provided by hospitals. (Need to get
full article)
Overall, Medicaid expansions
reduced uncompensated care by
5.4%; reduced uncompensated care
by 28.5% for hospitals with a
significant commitment to maternity
and infant care.
Cutler and Gruber (1996) CPS (1988-1993) Identifies effects of expanding
Medicaid eligibility on private and
Medicaid coverage of women and
children using within-state variation
due to differential timing of
Medicaid expansions. Includes state
and year fixed effects.
Fifty percent of increase in Medicaid
coverage (women and children) was
offset by reduction in private
insurance. Does not appear that
employers reduced offering of
insurance in response to expansions.
Dubay and Kenney (1996) CPS (1989, 1993) Estimetes effect of Medicaid
expansions on private coverage for
children. Medicaid eligibility is
estimated using TRIM2. Compares
trends in employer-sponsored private
coverage for poor children to trends
for men ages 18 to 44.
Crowd out of employer-sponsored
coverage is estimated to be 17-26 %
of the increase in Medicaid coverage.
Dubay and Kenney (1997) CPS (1989, 1993) Estimates effect of Medicaid
expansions on private coverage for
pregnant women. Insurance
coverage, Medicaid eligibility, and
pregnancy are simulated using Urban
Institute TRIM2. Compares trends in
employer-sponsored coverage rates
for near-poor pregnant women to
those for near-poor men.
Crowd-out is about 45% for near-
poor women.  Crowd-out of private
insurance is smaller for poorer
women; overall 30% of increased
Medicaid enrollment was offset by
declines in private coverage.Table 10 (continued)
Paper  (date) Data (Years) Empirical Strategy Results
Shore-Sheppard (1996) March CPS (1988-1996) Compares changes in state-age-
income cells with small and large
changes in Medicaid eligibility.
Estimates crowd-out between 31 and
57 percent when data through 1996
are included, 15 to 33 percent for
1988-1993.
Yazici and Kaestner (1998) NLSY  (1988, 1992) Compares take-up of Medicaid and
dropping of private insurance among
children made eligible for Medicaid
between 1988 and 1992 to trends for
the always eligible and never eligible
in panel data. 
Estimates that 14.5% of new
Medicaid enrollment due to
expansions came from private
insurance.
Blumberg, Dubay, and Norton
(2000)
SIPP (1990) Compares transitions from private
coverage and uninsurance to
Medicaid between 1989 and 1990 for
children likely to have been affected
by expansions to a comparison group
(older children with similar income)
in panel data. 
Estimate that 23% of movement
from private coverage to Medicaid
was due to displacement. No
evidence that those moving from
uninsurance to Medicaid would have
otherwise taken up private insurance.
Overall estimate of displacement of
private insurance is 4% of new
Medicaid enrollment.
Rask and Rask (2000) NMES (1987) and NHIS (1989,
1992)
Uses multinomial logit model of
insurance choice (Medicaid, private,
uninsured) for different income
groups in cross-section to estimate
relationship between availability of
public hospitals, uncompensated care
funds, and Medicaid on insurance
choices.
Large negative significant
relationship between the presence of
a public hospital in the county and
private coverage. Also significant
negative relationship between
Medicaid generosity and uninsured
care funds on private coverage rates. Table 10 (continued)
Paper  (date) Data (Years) Empirical Strategy Results
Shore-Sheppard (2000) March CPS (1988, 1989, 1994,
1995)
Uses variation in impact of Medicaid
expansions by region and income
decile to identify changes in private
coverage, Medicaid coverage and
uninsurance. Also uses single men as
additional control group. Uses those
estimates to form counterfactual
distributions of health insurance
coverage for children. 
Estimates of crowd-out between 7.6
percent and 45.3 percent. Concludes
that expansions had and equalizing




CPS and sample of firms (1989,
1990, 1991, 1993, 1995)
Examines effect of imputed fraction
of employees eligible for Medicaid
on employer offering of employee
and family coverage and employee
take-up.  Uses CPS to impute
fraction of workers in firm who are
Medicaid eligible according to
states’ rules. Includes state and year
fixed effects.
No evidence Medicaid expansions
effected offering of insurance to
employees. Statistically significant
negative effect of expansions on
offering family coverage.  Weak
evidence of negative effect of
Medicaid expansions on take-up of
employer-provided insurance.
SUMMARY Crowdout ranges from 10 to 50
percent of Medicaid increaseTable 11: Effects of Public Programs on Health
Paper (Date) Data (Years) Empirical Strategy/Program
Evaluated
Results
Piper, Ray and Griffin (1990) Vital statistics linked to Medicaid
enrollment files for Tennessee
(1985-87)
Compare prenatal utilization and
birth outcomes for births before and
after Medicaid expansion fr pregnant
women; some specifications focus on
groups most likely to be affected by
expansion.
No effect of Medicaid expansion for
pregnant women on birth outcomes
or initiation of prenatal care for any
group. Increase in fraction of
Medicaid covered births where
enrollment initiated in last 30 days of
pregnancy. Both before and after
expansion, more than two-thirds
enrolled in last 30 days of pregnancy. 
Haas, Udvarhelyi, and Epstein
(1993)
Massachusetts hospital discharge
data for all in-hospital births (1984,
1987)
Compare changes in outcomes of
uninsured pregnant women before
and after implementation of
statewide program for uninsured
pregnant women to changes for
privately insured and Medicaid
patients.
No statistically significant
differences in changes in adverse
outcomes for uninsured patients,
compared to Medicaid and privately
insured. The probability of cesarean
section rose for uninsured relative to
other groups.
Currie and Gruber (1996a) National Health Interview Survey
(1984-1992)
Identifies effects of Medicaid
eligibility for children on medical
care utilization (eg, doctor visit) and
child mortality using within-state
variation in eligibility due to
differential timing of Medicaid
expansions (“simulated instrument”).
Medicaid eligibility reduces 
probability of no doctor’s visit in last
year by 12.8 percent, increases
probability of hospitalization by 14
percent. Ten percentage point
increase in fraction eligible for
Medicaid reduces child mortality by
0.128 percentage points (3.4% of
paseline).     
Currie and Gruber (1996b) Vital Statistics (1979-1992),
National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (1979-1990)
Identifies effects of Medicaid
expansions for pregnant women on
utilization and outcomes.
Thirty percentage point increase in
eligibility is associated with 8.5
percent reduction in infant mortality.
Early, targeted expansions were
more cost-effective than later, broad
expansions. Table 11 (continued)
Paper (Date) Data (Years) Empirical Strategy/Program
Evaluated
Results
Currie and Gruber (1997) Vital Statistics (1979-1992) Same as above. Examines effects of
Medicaid eligibility on medical
utilization and outcomes for births.
Medicaid eligibility was associated
with more intensive treatment and
marginal improvements in neonatal
mortality.  Larger effect on neonatal
mortality for mothers living near a
hospital with a Neonatal Intensive
Care Unit.  
Joyce (1999) Medicaid administrative data linked
to birth certificates for birth in New
York City (1989, 1991)
Cross-sectional analysis of
relationship between birth outcomes
and Prenatal Care Assistance
Program (PCAP) participation,
controlling for demographics. Some
specifications stratify month of
pregnancy prenatal care was
initiated. IV estimates using number
of PCAP providers in area as
instrument for participation.
PCAP is associated with 20%
increase in WIC participation and 1.3
percentage point decrease in rate of
low birth-weight. Financial savings
are insufficient to offset the cost of
the program.
Kaestner, Joyce, and Racine (2001) National Health Interview Survey
(1989,1992), Nationwide Inpatient
Sample of ambulatory care sensitive
discharges (ACS) (1988-1992)
Examines effect of eligibility on
maternal reports of child’s health and
chronic conditions and bed days
(NHIS). Uses state-year-income and
age-year interactions to instrument
Medicaid eligibility for children aged
2-9. DD: children assigned to
treatment and control based on
median income of zip code (NIS
ACS).
Weak, if any, support for the
hypothesis that Medicaid improves
health.Table 11 (continued)
Paper (Date) Data (Years) Empirical Strategy/Program
Evaluated
Results
Dafny and Gruber (forthcoming) National Hospital Discharge Survey
(1983-1996).
Identifies effects of Medicaid
eligibility for children on avoidable
hospitalizations using within-state
variation in eligibility due to
differential timing of Medicaid
expansions (“simulated instrument”).
Estimates 22 percent decline in
avoidable hospitalizations due to
expansions.  Increase access to
hospitalization on newly eligible
resulted in net increase of 10 percent
in hospitalizations.
SUMMARY Small improvements in health